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COMMENTS
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-JOINT RETURNS-SEC-
TION 6013(E) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE RELIEVES INNO-
CENT SPOUSE OF LIABILITY FOR OMISSIONS IN THE RETURN WHEN HE
OR SHE HAD No REASON TO KNOW OF SUCH OMISSIONS. Sanders v.
United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975).
In January, 1971, Public Law 91-679 was passed by the
United States Congress as an amendment to the 1969 Tax Reform
Act' to provide equitable relief to an innocent spouse who, in
filing a joint income tax return with his or her spouse, became
1. Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063, codified in 26 U.S.C.
§ 6013 (1970), as amended, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6013 (Supp. 1972):
Joint Return-Income Tax Liability.
Section 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to joint returns of
income tax by husband and wife) is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following new subsection:
(e) Spouse Relieved of Liability in Certain Cases-
(1) In general-Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or
his delegate, if-
(A) a joint return has been made under this section for a
taxable year and on such return there was omitted from
gross income an amount properly includable therein which
is attributable to one spouse and which is in excess of 25
percent of the amount of gross income stated in the return,
(B) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return
he or she did not know of, and had no reason to know of,
such omission, and
(C) taking into account whether or not the other spouse
significantly benefitted directly or indirectly from the items
omitted from gross income and taking into account all other
facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other
spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year
attributable to such omission. ...
(2) Special rules-For purposes of paragraph (1)-
(A) the determination of the spouse to whom items of gross
income (other than gross income from property) are attrib-
utable shall be made without regard to community property
laws, and
(B) the amount omitted from gross income shall be deter-
mined in the manner provided by section 6501(e)(1)(A).
Section 2 of Pub. L. No. 91-679 added the following sentence to the INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 6653(b): "In the case of a joint return under section 6013, this subsection shall
not apply with respect to the tax of a spouse unless some part of the underpayment is
due to the fraud of such spouse." Section 3 of Pub. L. No. 91-679 provides that the
foregoing amendments shall apply to all taxable years to which the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
and 1939 apply; the law does not open a year which has been closed by the statute of
limitations, res judicata or otherwise.
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individually responsible for tax liabilities that arose from errors
in the return committed solely by that other spouse. Before the
enactment of what is now section 6013(e) of the Internal Revenue
Code, the signature of both spouses on a joint return created joint
and several financial liability of each spouse for any tax violations
associated with that return.' There were occasional circumstan-
ces, however, which caused the joint and several liability condi-
tion to result in rather harsh inequities.3 For example, the liabil-
ity existed even though the innocent spouse was completely igno-
rant of any asserted deficiencies in the joint return.4 Furthermore,
although the innocent spouse derived no significant benefit as a
result of the errors in the joint tax return, she was nevertheless
held responsible for a civil penalty since each spouse-was a party
to the return.5
2. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(a) states that "[a] husband and wife may make a
single return jointly of income taxes. . . even though one of the spouses has neither gross
income nor deductions. .. ."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(d)(3) provides that "if a joint return is made, the tax
shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall
be joint and several." See, e.g., Horn v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1967);
Howell v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 859 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 175 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1949).
3. See S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6089.
4. Davenport v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 921 (1967), held that wife jointly and sever-
ally liable for deficiencies and penalties resulting from the husband's fraud in intention-
ally not reporting embezzled funds even though the wife had no knowledge of the embez-
zlement or of its omission from gross income; Grimes v. Commissioner, 20 CCH Tax. Ct.
Mem. 1662 (1961), held that both spouses are jointly and severally liable on a joint return
even though the fraud is only attributable to one spouse; Pershall v. Commissioner, 18
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 612 (1959), found the wife jointly and severally liable despite strong
evidence that she in no way participated in, or knew of,, her husband's fraud. Accord,
Howell v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1949).
In response to the harsh results that were occasioned by the imposition of liability in
cases where the wife was wholly innocent, courts carved out judicial exceptions: Payne v.
United States, 247 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1957), joint return signed by mistake, wife held not
liable; Hickey v. Commissioner, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 546 (1955) joint return signed
under duress, wife not liable. Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36 (1967), rev'd, 405 F.2d
222 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969) and Dolan v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.
420 (1965), stand for the proposition that forgery, trickery and fraud, if proved by the
spouse, are valid defenses to joint and several liability. See Note, Innocent Spouses'
Liability for Fradulent Understatement of Taxable Income on Joint Returns, 56 VA. L.
REV. 1268 (1970).
5. TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6653. "Section 6013 provides that the tax liability of a
husband and wife who file a joint return shall be joint and several. Inasmuch as the statute
nowhere spells out the consequences of joint and several liability, it has been held that
Congress intended the common law rules to apply." Dolan v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 420,
426 (1965), citing United States v. Wainer, 211 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1954). See also
Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369 U.S. 672, 687 (1962); Commissioner v. Korell, 339
U.S. 619, 627-28 (1950); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947); Long v. Commis-
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In the four years since the passage of the so-called "Innocent
Spouse Act," the federal district and circuit courts, as well as the
United States Tax Court, have decided numerous cases in which
individual taxpayers have relied upon the remedial provisions of
section 6013(e).1 In a recent decision, however, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals took the opportunity to further clarify the scope
of section 6013(e) and, in the process, to reject an interpretation
of the statute by the Internal Revenue Service that sought to
impose significant limitations on the application of the provisions
to individual taxpayers.7
In Sanders v. United States' income tax deficiencies were
assessed against the taxpayer and her deceased husband's estate
because of substantial sums of income that the husband failed to
report during the years 1968 and 1969.1 Since the couple had filed
sioner, 289 U.S. 109, 111 (1933); Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560
(1932).
6. Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Commissioner,
34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 508 (1975); Quinn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 223 (1974); Harmon
v. Commissioner, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 436 (1974); Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.
300 (1973); Altman v. Commissioner, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 91 (1972), aff'd 475 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1973); Chanik v. Commissioner, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 851 (1972), aff'd 492 F.2d
1182 (6th Cir. 1974); McCoy v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732 (1972); McManus v. Commis-
sioner, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 999 (1972); Most v. Commissioner, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1062 (1972); Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971); Joss v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 378 (1971); Cain v. Commissioner, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 197 (1971), aff'd 460 F.2d
1243 (5th Cir. 1972).
7. Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975).
8. Id.
9. The tax deficiency for 1968 came to $7,327.93 and for 1969 to $20,120.79. The notice
of deficiency asserted omissions of gross income in 1968 of $18,800.97 from unknown
sources and $71,000 of capital gain from the sale of shares of stock in a company in which
Mr. Sanders was employed. 369 F. Supp. 160, 161 (N.D. Ala. 1973). The Internal Revenue
Service agent had reconstructed the Sanders' 1968-1969 gross income by using the "bank-
deposits-plus-expenditures" method of accounting as permitted by section 446(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This method is used when the taxpayer has no regular
method of accounting, or a method of accounting that does not clearly reflect income.
Basically, the agent begins with the assumption that all bank deposits and provable
expenditures represent gross income to the taxpayer; credit is given, however, if it can be
shown that a bank deposit actually represented a transfer of funds from another account
or funds that were borrowed, or which the taxpayer can otherwise show were not gross
income. The bank-deposits-plus-expenditures is an admittedly complex method of ac-
counting which, in this case, required more than 100 man-hours and four agents to deter-
mine that Mr. Sanders had underreported income for 1968 and 1969. The complexity of
the procedure was increased for several reasons: (1) The Sanders during this period had a
total of eight bank accounts with considerable transfers among them; (2) Mr. Sanders'
business affairs were exceedingly complex and he did not maintain a systematized book-
keeping or accounting procedure; (3) he had for a number of years been living well beyond
his means and had made extensive borrowings from relatives and banks that, if deposited,
3
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joint returns for the years in issue, the taxpayer became liable for
the asserted deficiency and the resulting penalties when her de-
ceased husband's estate proved insolvent.'0 After paying the defi-
ciency and the penalties, plus interest, she brought suit in the
district court based on the remedial provisions of section 6013(e)
for a refund of the amounts paid which were attributable to the
alleged omissions of gross income in the joint returns. Section
6013(e) (1) specifically provides that a spouse may avoid liability
if it can be established that:
(A) . . . there was omitted from gross income an amount pro-
perly includable therein which is attributable to one spouse and
which is in excess of 25% of the amount of gross income stated
in the return,
(B) ...in signing the return he or she did not know of, and
had no reason to know of, such omission, and
(C) taking into account whether or not the spouse significantly
benefited directly or indirectly from the items omitted from
gross income and taking into account all other facts and circum-
stances, it is inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the
deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such omis-
sion."
The district court, finding that the evidence produced by the
taxpayer satisfied the statutory prerequisites, concluded that it
would be inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for the asserted
deficiencies.' 2 The Government, in an appeal to the Fifth Circuit,
sought to clarify the scope of the statute and to narrow the district
court's unduly liberal construction. The appeal challenged, inter
alia,'3 the lower court's interpretation of subparagraph (B) of the
would not truly represent income; (4) he made various business "junkets" for which his
expenses had been reimbursed by the companies which employed him and which may
have been unjustly interpreted as income when he deposited such amounts; (5) Mr.
Sanders is now deceased and cannot confirm, deny or explain the inclusion of certain
items as income under the bank-deposits accounting method.
In addition, the fact that the taxpayer has only a high school education, and the fact
that she lived apart from her husband during most of the period in question and was
unfamiliar with all the various aspects of his financial affairs makes it exceedingly difficult
for her to attempt to explain any of the alleged unreported funds. These facts subsequently
influenced the district court's opinion that it would be inequitable to hold Mrs. Sanders
liable for the tax deficiency. 369 F. Supp. 166-67. See also note 13 infra.
10. See note 2 supra.
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(e).
12. 369 F. Supp. at 166-67.
13. While the Government asserted before the district court that the taxpayer had
not satisfied any of the three conditions imposed by section 6013(e), it did not dispute
[Vol. 27
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the 25 percent of gross income requirement of subparagraph (A) in its appeal to the Fifth
Circuit. The Government apparently believed that the strength of its appeal rested with
subparagraphs (B) and (C).
With respect to section 6013(e)(1)(C), the Government contended that the district
court applied an erroneous standard in determining that the taxpayer had not signifi-
cantly benefited from the omitted income and that it would be inequitable to hold her
liable for such omissions. Brief for Appellant at 28, 30.
The Fifth Circuit noted that the Senate Report accompanying section 6013(e) states
clearly that subparagraph (C) of that paragraph "requires a factual determination...
as to whether the spouse seeking relief from liability significantly benefited, directly or
indirectly, from the items omitted from gross income. The report also stated that:
A mere finding that the spouse "benefited" from the items omitted from gross
income will not be sufficient . . . to prevent that spouse from obtaining relief
from liability for the tax. For the spouse to be prevented from obtaining relief
there must also be a finding that the benefit was "significant" and that "taking
into account all other facts and circumstances," it is not "inequitable to hold
the . . . spouse liable for the deficiency in tax . .. ."
S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6089, 6092. After carefully
examining the district court's conclusion that the taxpayer had not significantly benefited
from the unreported income and, even if she had, that it would be inequitable to hold her
liable for the tax deficiencies, the Fifth Circuit held that such a finding was not clearly
erroneous and should, therefore, be permitted to stand. 509 F.2d at 169.
The Government, pointing to the fact that the taxpayer had received the benefits of
an insurance policy that had been increased from $50,000 to $145,000 during the time
when Mr. Sanders was underreporting his income and had also received the proceeds from
the sale of certain properties acquired in that same period, concluded that "Congress...
did not intend to afford taxpayers any relief from joint liability, despite future hardships,
if they retained unreported income or the fruits of unreported income which could be used
to discharge the liability." Brief for Appellant at 18.
The circuit court, however, neatly disposed of this contention:
Taken literally, this argument is plainly contradicted by the language of
[section 6013](e)(1)(C), which enjoins the Commissioner and the courts to
consider the presence of significant benefits from the unreported income as only
one factor in the overall decision of whether it is equitable to charge the spouse
with the tax. Moreover, nothing in the statute or its legislative history purports
to forbid the consideration of probable future hardship when examining the
equities of the case.
509 F.2d at 171 n.16 (emphasis added).
The other facts that influenced the district court's opinion that holding the taxpayer
liable for the deficiency would be inequitable were undisputed; e.g., she is a widow with
a preschool age child to support; her age and level of education-as well as her household
and child-rearing duties-make her chances for employment uncertain; most of the bene-
fit from the unreported income will accrue to the child for its education, feeding and
shelter; the complicated method of determining the amount of unreported income put the
taxpayer at a severe disadvantage in meeting her burden of proof as to whether particular
items were in fact gross income (the Government takes the benefit of a legal presumption
that its determinations as to inclusions in gross income are correct). 369 F. Supp. at 166-
67; Brief for Appellee at 25-31.
In general, there are some very obvious problems with section 6013(e)(1)(C): First,
exactly how much benefit constitutes "significant" is not made clear by the terms of the
statute. Second, there is a subtle bias against married couples living together since the
innocent spouse cannot avoid a certain amount of benefit. This is often the case where
the spouse earns no income herself. See, e.g., Upshaw v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 737 (7th
Cir. 1969); Campbell v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1, 12 (1971). See also 45 TEMP. L.Q. 448
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statute which provides that the innocent spouse shall bear the
burden of proving that he or she did not know, or have reason to
know, of the unreported gross income." The Government con-
tended that the statute imposes a very rigorous standard of proof,
a standard which would require the taxpayer seeking relief to
demonstrate that she was "completely without fault and could
not possibly have discovered the omission before executing the
returns."' 5
The district court, on the other hand, rejected this narrow
construction of the statutory language. Instead, the taxpayer's
contention "that the highest permissible standard of care would
be what a reasonable person in the taxpayer's subjective position
would have discovered" was accepted by the district court as
being more consistent with the statute's general remedial pur-
pose.'" The Fifth Circuit, affirming the lower court's reasoning,
endeavored to resolve any conflict over the requisite standard of
care that individual taxpayers must meet in order to satisfy sub-
paragraph (B).'7
(1972), criticizing the vagueness of section 6013(e) and proposing that the 25 percent
requirement of subparagraph (A) be eliminated because it discriminates against less well-
to-do spouses, and contending that the "significant" benefit provision of subparagraph
(C) should be further clarified. Cf. 22 ALA. L. Rav. 591 (1970); 56 VA. L. REv. 1268 (1970).
The Senate Report, however, does offer some guidance with respect to the significant
benefit issue:
It is not intended that the term "benefit" as used here include ordinary support
of the innocent spouse. Unusual support or transfers of property to the spouse
would, however, constitute "benefit" and should be taken into consideration in
determining whether the spouse benefited from the items omitted from gross
income. Such "benefit" may be received by the spouse several years after the
year in which the omitted item should have been included in gross income.
S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6089, 6092.
The attempt to delimit the meaning of "benefit," however, raises yet another issue;
i.e., what constitutes "support"? As the circuit court in Sanders recognized, "one person's
luxury can be another's necessity, and the lavishness of an expense must be measured
from each family's relative level of ordinary support . . . .This follows naturally from
the proposition that expenses for ordinary support cannot normally put the spouse on
notice of omissions from gross income." 509 F.2d at 168 n.12. See also Mysse v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C. 680, 698 (1972). Thus, ordinary support depends on the particular standard
of living to which a spouse is accustomed. During the period in issue, the Sanders were
enjoying a "fairly high and generally improving standard of living;" the amount of benefit
required to be considered "significant," therefore, would be much greater than that re-
quired of a family of more modest means. 509 F.2d at 168.
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(e)(1)(B).
15. 509 F.2d at 166; Brief for Appellant at 17.
16. 369 F. Supp. at 166. The district court held that the "plaintiff has proven to the
Court's satisfaction, that, as a reasonably prudent taxpayer, she had no reason to know
of the omissions." Id. See also Brief for Appellee at 18-19.
17. 509 F.2d at 166-70.
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In the Government's view, section 6013(e) was not intended
to provide sweeping relief from the joint and several liability con-
dition that is imposed on taxpayers who choose to take advantage
of the tax benefits that the joint return provides."8 This argument
finds limited support in certain comments which preceeded the
passage of the Innocent Spouse Act when it was reported out of
the House Ways and Means Committee. The committee mem-
bers, describing the Act's remedial purposes, emphasized those
situations in which the existing tax law had resulted in very
"grave injustices." 9 One of the more egregious situations the
committee referred to involved the liability of a wife for the tax
deficiency and fraud penalty when the husband had embezzled
funds and omitted the proceeds from gross income."0 That the
spouse had absolutely no knowledge of the embezzlement or the
omission from gross income, or that she had not received any
benefit from the embezzled funds, was considered irrelevant in
the ultimate determination of joint and several liability for the
tax deficiency.21 This result seemed all the more inequitable when
the innocent spouse had been deserted or divorced by the culpa-
ble spouse-who either dissipated or absconded with the
funds-leaving her with none of the illicit funds to pay the tax
deficiencies and penalties.2 2 Thus the Government concluded
18. Brief for Appellant at 20-21.
19. 116 Cong. Rec. 43350 (1970). Note particularly the comment by Senator Byrnes
of Wisconsin that "the committee's attention was called to cases in which one spouse had
no knowledge of the other's income or failure to report it, and did not benefit at all from
the unreported income, yet was held liable for its omission from the joint return." Id. at
43351 (emphasis added).
20. The example recited in both the House and Senate Reports was based on Scudder
v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36 (1967). Note the exhortation by Judge Hoyt:
Although we have much sympathy for petitioner's unhappy situation and are
appalled at the harshness of this result in the instant case, the inflexible statute
leaves no room for amelioration. It would seem that only remedial legislation
can soften the impact of the rule of strict individual liability for income taxes
on the many married women who are unknowingly subjected to its provisions
by filing joint returns.
Id. at 41, cited in S. REP. No. 94-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6089, 6091.
21. See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
22. In Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680 (1972), the Government advanced the
specious argument that the relief provisions of section 6013(e) were designed primarily for
the benefit of spouses who are divorced, deserted or separated. Thus, since the taxpayer
in Mysse had an "apparently harmonious marital relationship," it would not be inequita-
ble to hold her liable for the tax deficiencies. Id. at 699, 700.
This represents yet another clear example of misreading of the statutory purpose by
the Government. The Senate Report plainly states that "whether the spouse in question
is deserted or is divorced or separated" is but another factor which should be considered
7
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that the intent of Congress was to provide limited relief specifi-
cally to cases of extreme hardship and not to permit indiscrimi-
nate escape from the basic provision for joint and several liabil-
ity.23
The fact that the committee reports speak only of certain
"obvious" or "typical" hardship cases leads the Government to
the dubious conclusion that the legislative intent was to restrict
the Act to those specific "types" of situations:
In enacting Section 6013(e), Congress was concerned with the
situation where a spouse with the exercise of a high degree of
care could not have learned that the joint tax returns were not
correct. The committee reports indicated this by giving the ex-
ample of the spouse whose husband has embezzled large
amounts of money and has not reported the embezzlement in-
come. 
2 4
The committee reports identified a particular "form" of illegal
activity-embezzlement-that is usually very difficult to detect.
The Government, therefore, argued that it is reasonable to as-
sume that Congress intended to restrict the Act to those spouses
who could not be expected to know, even after exercising a high
by the court-in addition to how significant were the benefits received and all other factors
in mitigation-in determining whether it would be inequitable to hold the spouse liable
for the deficiency. S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6089, 6092.
The Mysse court tersely dismissed the Government's contention:
We find nothing in the section [6013(e)], however, to indicate that its relief
was intended to be limited to spouses who are victims of broken marriages ....
[The taxpayer] was at as great a disadvantage in the litigation of the liability
here in issue as she would have been if she and [her husband] had been di-
vorced. We find [the Government's] argument to be without merit. .. . This
is exactly the kind of situation section 6013(e) was intended to cover, and [this
spouse] is entitled to its benefits.
57 T.C. at 700.
This technical and highly restrictive argument by the Government is indicative of the
restrictive attitude taken by the Service with respect to the innocent spouse statute and
the scope of its application. See note 13 supra. The statute appears to contain an inherent
bias against couples living together with respect to the innocent spouse's ability to prove
that he or she received no significant benefit from the unreported income. Obviously, if
the Government's argument in Mysse that the statute was intended to apply only to
deserted or divorced spouses were to prevail, the administration of the tax laws would be,
at the worst, encouraging the dissolution of marriages and, at the least, unjustly prejudic-
ing the harmonious marital relationship. Such a result would plainly abrogate the inten-
tion of Congress "to bring government tax collection practices into accord with basic
principles of equity and fairness." S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
6089, 6091.
23. Brief for Appellant at 20, 21.
24. Id. at 25, 26.
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degree of care,2 of the other spouse's illegal source of income or
the failure to report such income on the joint return.
The obvious flaw in this argument is that Congress explicitly
stated the contrary. The legislative history to section 6013(e)
clearly states that it "has applicability to an omission from gross
income for any reason and is not limited to embezzlement, theft
or similar activities. ' 21 Neither the Senate nor the House Report
intimates that section 6013(e) is to be directed solely at remedy-
ing the explicit factual situations recounted in the explanation
prefacing the Act's passage; nor does any of the language -in the
Act's history support the Government's restrictive interpretation
of the standard of care imposed upon the innocent spouse.2 1 In
fact, only one paragraph in the committee reports deals with the
"reason to know" phrase and the standard it imposes. The Senate
Report states that:
It is intended that the spouse, [in proving that he or she had
no reason to know of the omission from gross income] will have
the usual burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on
this issue and not the higher burden required of the Government
in civil fraud cases.
2 8
25. The Government is never clear about the exact level of care or standard of proof
that it wants to be imposed on the innocent spouse. Throughout its brief, it variously refers
to "a very high standard of care," a "diligent effort" to discover omissions, a "high degree
of care," a "rigorous" burden of proof, and proof that she was "completely without fault
and could not possibly have discovered the omission before executing the returns." Brief
for Appellant, passim (emphasis added).
26. S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6089, 6091; Brief for
Appellee at 11.
27. The most restrictive language surrounding the statute's intended scope is con-
tained in the House Report. 116 Cong. Rec. 43350, 43351 (1970). Nevertheless, there is no
explicit language in either the House or Senate Report that purports to delimit the stat-
ute's scope to specifically those situations recounted as obvious examples of inequities
resulting from the tax law as it stood at that time.
The Fifth Circuit also read the legislative history in a manner inconsistent with the
Government's restrictive approach:
We simply implement Congress' clearly stated intent that courts should not
limit the relief afforded by § 6013(e) to the case where assessment of the tax
would be patently harsh and oppressive but should instead consider the individ-
ual situations of each taxpayer who arguably comes within the statute's cover-
age. S. Rep. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 6089, 6091.
509 F.2d at 167 n.6.
The circuit court conceded that some limited portions of the House Committee Re-
port arguably supported the Government's restrictive reading of the statutory scope. The
court concluded, however, "that the Senate Report is a clearer reflection of Congress' final
intent." 509 F.2d at 167 n.6.
28. S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6089, 6091.
9
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The Government argued further that the statutory language
itself implied that a very high degree of care is required of the
innocent spouse in order to satisfy the three conditions of section
6013(e).25 It is not at all clear, however, that the phrase "had no
reason to know of" is more restrictive than such phrases as
"should not have known" or "could not have known" or "would
not have known with the exercise of reasonable care." Although
several Tax Court decisions were cited to support the contention
that the phrase "no reason to know" implies a higher degree of
care than the other phrases, 0 the cases actually dealing with the
29. Brief for Appellant at 26.
30. The Government cited three cases: Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300 (1973);
McCoy v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732 (1972); Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373
(1971).
The minimal precedential value of Adams is discussed at notes 33-44 and accompany-
ing text, infra.
McCoy and Sonnenborn do not stand for the proposition for which they are cited. In
McCoy the issue did not even remotely concern the taxpayer's degree of care under the
"reason to know" requirement; nor did the court consider the taxpayer's "reason to know"
per se. The actual basis of the taxpayer's petition in McCoy was that she was ignorant of
the legal tax consequences of certain facts which led to the creation, and subsequent
failure to report, of certain income. McCoy, then, stands for the proposition that section
6013(e) does not "abate joint and several liability where the lack of knowledge of the
omitted income is predicated on mere ignorance of the legal tax consequences of transac-
tions the facts of which are either in the possession of the spouse seeking relief or reasona-
bly within his reach." 57 T.C. at 734.
The Fifth Circuit, however, read the Tax Court's opinion in McCoy with a generally
critical eye:
This is perhaps a permissible reading of § 6013(e)(1)(A)-(B) in light of Con-
gress's general intent to extend relief only where equity demands it, but it is
difficult to square with a literal reading of the statutory language. Subparagraph
(B) mentions "such omission," which obviously refers back to (e)(1)(A) where
omissions are described as an "amount properly included . . ." (emphasis
added). Since the propriety of including a given sum can finally be determined
only by the IRS or the courts, subparagraph (B) seemingly makes ignorance of
the fact that known receipts constitute taxable income a valid justification for
not knowing or having reason to know of omissions from gross income. Neverthe-
less, the practical problems that have always prevented acceptance of an igno-
rance of the law defense in the criminal law area, see W. LaFave & A. Scott,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw § 47, at 363-64 (1972), arguably apply just as force-
fully here.
509 F.2d at 169 n.14.
In Sonnenborn the taxpayer seeking innocent spouse status declined to testify with
respect to her actual knowledge or reason to know. Furthermore, the taxpayer had an-
nually received, by checks drawn to her, over $46,000 of the omitted income about which
she allegedly had no knowledge. The court held that she "knew" of the omissions and,
therefore, did not come within the protection of section 6013(e).
The cases cited by the Government, therefore, do not stand for any special standard
of investigative care that spouses must uniformly satisfy in order to come within the terms
10
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"reason to know" condition lend "scant support for the strict
reading suggested by the government.
'31
Furthermore, there are few cases that consider in any detail
the innocent spouse statute and, perhaps for that reason, there
appears to be no reported case that has squarely faced the issue
of what level of care the "reason to know" phrase imposes. Most
of the cases turn on whether the spouse seeking relief under sec-
tion 6013(e) testifies as to her lack of actual knowledge and
whether the surrounding circumstances make her testimony cred-
ible.
2
In a 1973 case, however, the Tax Court denied relief to a
taxpayer on the basis of the "reason to know" standard even
though the taxpayer had claimed total ignorance of the items
omitted by the other spouse from gross income." In Adams v.
Commissioner34 the taxpayer and his wife, although not engaged
in a partnership, were both involved in the business of marketing
printed business forms. 5 For a three year period, about 1952 to
1955, the taxpayer kept records of the wife's sales commissions.
Beginning in 1956, however, the wife adamantly refused to supply
any sales information to the taxpayer. Although the wife kept
of the innocent spouse statute. The only language in any of the cited cases dealing with
the burden imposed on the spouse seeking relief is found in McCoy where the Tax Court
quoted the statement of Senator Byrnes in the House Report that section 6013(e)(1)(B)
requires "complete ignorance of the omission [of income]." 57 T.C. at 735, citing 116
Cong. Rec. 43350, 43351 (1970). This statement, however, pertains more directly to the
taxpayer's actual knowledge and not to the "no reason to know" phrase of subparagraph
(B).
31. 509 F.2d at 167. In fact, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, Mysse v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680 (1972), offers support for the more liberal, subjective standard
of care proposed by the appellee and adopted by the district court in Sanders, rather than
the Government's restrictive and unduly narrow standard. 509 F.2d at 167 n.7. See also
the discussion of Mysse and Anderson v. Commissioner, 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 508 (1975)
in the text accompanying notes 63-75 infra.
32. For cases denying relief where the spouse failed to testify, see, e.g., McManus v.
Commissioner, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 999 (1972); Most v. Commissioner, 31 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1062 (1972); Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213 (1971); Sonnenborn v. Com-
missioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971). Cases granting relief where the spouse convincingly testifies,
e.g., Shapolsky v. Commissioner, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 260 (1972); Cain v. Commis-
sioner, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Memre 197 (1971), aff'd 460 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1972). But see
Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300 (1973), discussed at text accompanying notes 33-44
infra.
33. Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300 (1973).
34. Id.
35. The wife was apparently a very astute and successful businesswoman. Although
she kept her business separate from her husband, initially she depended on referrals from
his business. Id. at 302.
11
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books and records, made bank deposits and prepared the joint
income tax returns for the taxpayer and herself for the years in
issue, she refused to furnish taxpayer copies of these returns."
The Commissioner determined deficiencies in the joint individual
income tax liability for taxpayer and his wife for the years 1956-
1961 totaling in excess of $46,000. The underpayments of tax for
such years were due to omissions by the wife of income earned
from her sales commissions since she had no other source of in-
come. The Tax Court decided that the taxpayer was not entitled
to relief as an "innocent spouse" because he failed to satisfy, inter
alia, the "no reason to know" condition of section 6013(e)(1)(B).
3
The Commissioner had argued, and the court agreed, that not-
withstanding the taxpayer's plea that he had signed the federal
tax returns under duress or that his signatures were forged, the
taxpayer was put on notice of the omissions from gross income
because of the wife's refusal to be forthright about the family
income. 8 Additionally, the court apparently believed, at least in
the absence of a showing to the contrary, that the taxpayer did
have access to the books and records of his wife and that he
should have made an effort to ascertain the correct amount of
gross income for the family.39 Thus, the wife's refusal to furnish
the husband a copy of the joint tax returns was sufficient at least
to put the husband on notice; i.e., he had reason to know that
income was not being reported. The husband's failure to investi-
gate the available books and records of the wife was tantamount
to "closing his eyes" to the realities of the situation."0 The mere
36. The Tax Court's opinion is not clear as to whether or not the taxpayer-husband
actually requested to peruse the joint returns. The fact that the wife "repeatedly refused"
to furnish the returns, however, certainly implies that to be the case. Id.
37. The Commissioner also argued that the taxpayer-husband had not satisfied sub-
paragraph (C) of section 6013(e) which requires the taxpayer to show that he did not
significantly benefit from the omitted items of income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
6013(e)(1)(C). The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer had failed to meet his burden
of proof with respect to both subparagraphs (B) and (C). 60 T.C. at 303-04.
38. 60 T.C. at 303.
39. The Tax Court held that even if the taxpayer's signatures were forged or signed
under duress, the fact that he "made no effort to set straight his separate tax liability with
the Commissioner" was sufficient to hold him jointly and severally liable for the tax
deficiencies owing. Id. Also, the taxpayer failed to show that the records and books kept
by the wife were not available to him. Id. Thus, the opinion rather clearly indicates that
when facts or circumstances actually brought to the taxpayers attention would cause a
reasonable person to suspect that another person is concealing income, then the taxpayer
is under an obligation to investigate his suspicions and, if necessary, independently clarify
his tax status with the IRS.
40. In Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680 (1972), the Tax Court warned that spouses
[Vol. 27
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss4/10
1976] INNOCENT SPOUSE ACT
fact that the taxpayer testified as to his ignorance of the omis-
sions, therefore, was not sufficient to bring him within the protec-
tive ambit of the Innocent Spouse Act.4'
The opinion of the Adams court, however, is not particularly
supportive of the Government's contention that the taxpayer in
Sanders fell below the very rigorous standard of care required by
the statute. There are very significant factual distinctions be-
tween the two cases. For example, in Sanders there were no books
or records kept by the deceased husband which the taxpayer-wife
could have examined to determine if the husband was underre-
porting his income; nor was she as learned in business mat-
ters-having only a high school education-as the taxpayer in
Adams. It is unlikely that the taxpayer in Sanders could have
understood the extremely complicated financial affairs of her
husband even if he had kept books or records and made them
available for her inspection. 2 Additionally, there was evidence in
the Sanders case that the taxpayer's husband had a general pol-
icy against discussing financial matters with his wife. He did not,
however, explicitly refuse information, as did the taxpayer's
spouse in Adams, about such financial matters that would have
given the innocent spouse reason to suspect, or be on notice, that
income was not being reported.43 The absence of candor by the
would not be allowed to "close . . . [their] eyes to unusual or lavish expenditures" in
determining whether they had reason to know that items were omitted from income. Id.
at 699.
41. 60 T.C. at 303.
42. The evidence in Sanders also indicated severe emotional and drinking problems
that would have impeded the taxpayer's ability to understand her husband's varied finan-
cial affairs. The husband, during the years in issue, was engaged in at least five different
ventures, borrowed extensively from relatives and banks, insisted that the couple adopt a
child even though the taxpayer objected and lived away from home during most of the
period. 369 F. Supp. at 162-63; Brief for Appellee at 6-9. These circumstances would seem
to buttress the taxpayer's contention that she did not know and had no reason to know of
the omissions of income.
43. The district found as a fact that Mr. Sanders "did not confide financial matters
to his wife and indicated, at several times, to friends that it was his policy not to do so."
369 F. Supp. at 163.
More importantly from the standpoint of the Adams decision, however, was the
absence of evidence that Mr. Sanders was evasive or refused to be forthright with his wife
concerning the couple's income. The Fifth Circuit noted that:
Charles requested Bettye [taxpayer] to balance checkbooks and keep other
financial records. These actions are inconsistent with an intent to conceal the
sources and amount of the family income. This case is therefore distinguishable
from Adams.
509 F.2d at 167 n.11.
The fact that the taxpayer had balanced the family's checking accounts and had
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taxpayer's husband in Sanders is significant because the Adams
court appeared to believe that such behavior, being inherently
suspicious, was dispositive of the issue of the taxpayer's reason
to know.44 The extent of the factual distinctions between the two
cases, therefore, necessarily minimizes the precedential value of
Adams.
Finally, the Government proposed to the Fifth Circuit yet
another justification for imposing a very high-although still un-
specified45-degree of care upon the innocent spouse. The district
court's error of law, so the Government argued, is exemplified by
the factors which most influenced its conclusion that the tax-
payer had no reason to know of the omissions of income. 4 That
typed other financial records pertaining to her husband's business ventures, however, cuts
against her plea of ignorance with respect to Mr. Sanders' omissions of income. The
district court made several other findings of fact, however, which it believed prevented
the taxpayer from learning of the omissions: (1) the fact that the taxpayer signed the
returns without examining them; (2) the complexity of Mr. Sanders' business affairs; (3)
the taxpayer's emotional and drinking problems which impaired her capacity to under-
stand her husband's financial affairs; (4) the taxpayer's limited education and business
experience. 369 F. Supp. at 162-63.
44. 60 T.C. at 303. The Tax Court's opinion on this issue was swift and unequivocal:
"The Commissioner contends that the. . . [taxpayer] was put on notice of the omissions
by his former wife's refusal to be forthright about the family income. We agree." Id.
45. See note 25 supra.
46. Prior to Sanders, the cases generally suggested three factors that are significant
in determining whether a spouse had reason to know of omissions from gross income:
(1) participation in business affairs or bookkeeping. See, e.g., Quinn v. Commissioner,
62 T.C. 273 (1974); Chanik v. Commissioner, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 851 (1972), aff'd 492
F.2d 1182 (6th Cir. 1974); Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373 (1971).
(2) unusual or lavish expenditures. See, e.g., Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680
(1972).
(3) the guilty spouse's refusal to be forthright about the couple's income. See, e.g.,
Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300 (1973).
Three more factors were added to the list by the district court in Sanders, 509 F.2d at
168:
(4) the innocent spouse's emotional condition.
(5) the complexity of the business transactions which produced the unreported funds.
(6) the complexity of the method used by the IRS for deducing the omissions.
See also Bierman, Recent Decisions Clarify the Scope of the Innocent Spouse Provisions
of Section 6013(e), J. TAXATION 52 (July, 1975).
The Fifth Circuit only partially approved the consideration of the additional factors
that influenced the district court. The district court had emphasized its reluctance to hold
the taxpayer responsible for determining that items were being omitted from gross income
under a "rather esoteric method of accounting which apparently gave an experienced,
capable and diligent revenue agent . . . considerable difficulties." 369 F. Supp. at 166.
The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to fully approve this line of reasoning:
The bank deposits plus expenditures method used by the IRS agent here is
employed when the taxpayer has "no regular method of accounting, or a method
of accounting that does not clearly reflect his income." 369 F. Supp. at 162; 26
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the standard of care imposed by the district court was much lower
than that intended by Congress is evidenced by its reliance on the
claimant-taxpayer's severe emotional problems and alcoholism
as two of the principal factors tending to substantiate the tax-
payer's claim that she had no actual knowledge or reason to know
of the omissions.47 In support of this proposition the Government
advanced the argument that "problems [such as alcoholism and
emotional disturbances] in the past have not been viewed as
excusing failures to discover omissions where the taxpayer's con-
duct need only have been not willful."4 The authority for this
contention, however, comes from three cases which were uni-
formly concerned with the criminal liability of a single taxpayer
for his own willful and fraudulent failure to file returns or report
income.49 In each case, the appellate court did not reject summa-
rily the taxpayer's assertion of emotional disturbance or alcohol-
ism as a defense, but instead relied on the lower court's disposi-
tion of the case based on an adequate consideration of all the
facts. None of the decisions ruled that such considerations could
not be offered as a mitigating factor, if not as an absolute defense.
Furthermore, the very fact that the appellate court entertained
U.S.C. § 446(b) (1967). Mrs. Sanders played a significant role in maintaining
tax records for the marriage. It would be anomalous to hold that she had no
reason to know of omissions from gross income because she and Charles kept
such incomplete or confusing records that the IRS required complicated meth-
ods to deduce the couple's true income situation. The Sanders' access to the
facts of their own finances was much better than that of the IRS. The Service
used its complex accounting procedure in lieu of the more complete facts avail-
able to Charles and Bettye but not reflected in their written records. As a factual
matter, then, we would give only slight weight to the intricacy of the procedure
used by the IRS to detect the omissions.
509 F.2d at 170. See also Harmon v. Commissioner, 33 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 436 (1974). It
would seem appropriate, nonetheless, for a court to consider the complexity of the business
transactions and the degree of difficulty in deducing that items were omitted from gross
income in those cases where the innocent spouse had not participated in maintaining any
of the guilty spouse's tax records or where other facts and circumstances (see note 46
supra) would affect the innocent spouse's ability to comprehend such matters.
47. Brief for Appellee at 27.
48. Id.
49. United States v. Mitchell, 432 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910
(1971), denying a motion for remand on defendant's assertion of attorney's failure to
introduce evidence of his drinking and emotional problems in a criminal trial for failure
to file a return; United States v. Griffin, 69-2 U.S. Tax Ct. 9611 (W.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd
per curiam, 432 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1970), denial of defendant's appeal to overturn adverse
judgment on grounds of psychiatric and alcoholic problems; Estate of Craddock v. Com-
missioner, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 805 (1968), refusal to reverse lower court conviction of
defendant for failure to report kickbacks as gross income despite plea of alcoholism. See
Brief for Appellant at 27; Brief for Appellee at 17.
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the taxpayer's assertion of emotional or alcoholic problems
plainly contravenes the Government's contention that such fac-
tors cannot be considered in determining liability." In addition,
the Government's argument, in effect, would create a higher stan-
dard of care under the innocent spouse statute than that existing
with respect to the willful failure to file or fraud statutes. This
argument, from the taxpayer's point of view, would be inherently
unfair since
[tihe standard of care . . . under the fraud statute is with
respect to knowledge or reason to know of a taxpayer's own
actions-income he received, income he did not report, tax re-
turns he did or did not prepare and did or did not file. Under
the innocent spouse statute, the standard of care. . . would be
with respect to a duty to keep watch over the economic affairs
of another taxpayer. Any such standard of care or duty to inves-
tigate should . . . be much lower, not higher, than in deciding
the issue of (in effect) whether a taxpayer knew, or should have
had reason to know, that he himself did not file a return, or
omitted items of income attributable to him from a return.51
Another flaw in the Government's "very high standard of
care" interpretation is that it would exceed the standard of "ordi-
nary care" that is imposed on all other taxpayers, whether filing
single or joint returns. Why should an ordinary spouse who
merely signs a joint return be held to a higher standard of care
with respect to the contents of that return than the culpable
spouse who is actually responsible for the omissions that lead to
the tax penalties?52 Such an interpretation seems patently unfair
and, in effect, would convert the Innocent Spouse Act into mean-
ingless and superfluous legislation.. Why did Congress pass the
Act if not to extend fairness and equity into the administration
50. See note 49 supra.
51. Brief for Appellee at 17, 18.
52. The fact that the Innocent Spouse Act extends "equitable" relief to taxpayers
could lend support to the argument that perhaps Congress did not want any "standard"
to be applied, let alone a higher standard than that already imposed. In other words,
rather than applying an inflexible standard of care-whatever level of care that might
be-the courts should consider the facts of each particular situation and, applying princi-
ples of equity, determine the issue of liability. If one considers this construction of the Act
as a legitimate extrapolation of congressional intent, then it is conceivable that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service advanced the higher standard of care argument as a matter of strat-
egy-propounding the higher standard of care as a method of backing the court into
adopting some form of standard, whether it be high or low. The result being that the
Service would at least establish some sort of standard to be applied in tax suits of this
nature and thereby strengthen its position in future litigation.
[Vol. 27
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of the tax laws by imposing a lower-not higher-standard of care
that one can realistically expect to be exercised by a spouse in the
typical marital situation?53
Congress could not have contemplated imposing a standard
of care that would, in effect, obligate the spouse to investigate
thoroughly the return in every detail. If that had been the desired
result, Congress could simply have left the tax law as it stood
before section 6013(e) was enacted. The assertion that the spouse
must prove that he or she is "completely without fault and could
not possibly have discovered the omission""4 would make the
spouse "nothing short of a watchdog" 55 over every detail of the tax
return and the other spouse's financial affairs. It was precisely in
response to the injustices which resulted under that system of tax
collection which prompted the Congress to amend the 1969 Tax
Reform Act by enacting section 6013(e); i.e., the recognition that,
due to the complexities of the Internal Revenue Code and the
intricacies of modern marriages, there are many instances in
which it would be inequitable to impose financial liability on a
spouse for the tax violations of the other spouse. 6
The more reasonable assumption is that Congress intended
to relieve certain perceived injustices that sometimes result from
imposing potentially large tax liabilities upon a typical spouse
when such spouse had merely signed the return, perhaps out of a
desire to preserve marital comity, and was oblivious to the tax
violations lurking therein.57 Fairness dictates that the burden of
proof to be borne by the innocent spouse be lowered. Toward this
end, the spouse should only be required to (a) credibly testify as
to the lack of actual knowledge of the omissions of income and
(b) present the particular factors surrounding the spouse's failure
53. See S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nmvs 6089, 6091.
54. Brief for Appellant at 17.
55. Brief for Appellee at 22. In order to satisfy the Government's interpretation that
the spouse must be "completely without fault and could not possibly have discovered"
the omitted items, a spouse would have to exercise inordinate care in the typical housewife
duties that most spouses perform, e.g., balancing a checkbook. Signing the joint return
would also require the spouse to carefully scrutinize items of income, deductions, etc., and
perhaps challenge the husband if the return seemed unusual. Obviously, such a require-
ment is not only hopelessly unrealistic and impractical, but it would also create an under-
current of distrust and suspicion in a social institution-marriage-that is basically
grounded in trust. See 45 TmsP. L.Q. 448 (1972). But see 22 ALA. L. Rlv. 591 (1970).
56. See Note, The Joint Tax Return and the Innocent Spouse, 10 J. FAMILY L. 472
(1971).
57. 45 TEip. L.Q. 448 (1972). See also S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6089.
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to discover the violations from which the court can determine
whether a reasonably prudent taxpayer under the circumstances
would have had no reason to know of such omissions."
This more flexible, subjective standard of the "reasonably
prudent taxpayer under the circumstances" is more concordant
with the basic principles underlying the Act and with the actuali-
ties of the marital condition with respect to tax matters. 9 "The
innocent spouse in signing the return is by definition not aware
of her husband's activities. In all probability she does not know
that an exaction can be levied against her to pay for them."6 Nor
would the subjective standard afford the typical spouse an exces-
sive advantage over the Government with respect to the joint
return procedure.' "[W]here the wife is the co-conspirator, the
Government has sufficient investigatory powers at its command
to obtain the evidence against her, even though the privilege of
58. Of course, the other prerequisites to relief, the 25 percent of gross income and no
significant benefit requirements, would still have to be satisfied by the claimant-spouse.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(e)(1)(A) and (C).
59. See notes 55-57 supra.
60. O'Hara, Joint Responsibility for Joint Income Tax Returns: Options, Limitations
and Liabilities, N.Y.U. 26th INsT. ON FED. TAX 111, 116 (1968).
61. The Government's rationale for restricting the scope of section 6013(e) is based
on several considerations which, in some cases, appear justified. First, the privilege of
filing a joint return confers a substantial economic benefit on married taxpayers. "The
rate of tax applied against a given amount of taxable income is substantially lower when
the income is reported on a joint return than when reported on other types of individual
tax returns." Brief for Appellant at 19, citing INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1. The wife,
therefore, receives the economic benefit of the reduced tax rate and, in addition, if she
earns income herself, the legal benefit of her husband's joint and several liability. See 55
HARV. L. REV. 145 (1941). Second, the joint and several liability condition is necessary for
reasons of administrative efficiency in order that "any doubt as to the existence of such
liability should be set at rest, if the privilege of filing such joint returns is continued."
H.R. Doe. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). Third, since the ability to file a joint
return is voluntary, it is arguable that the wife has assumed the legal consequences which
follow that choice; if a spouse desires to avoid joint and several liability he or she is free
to file a separate return.
This last argument, however, ignores the character of the marital relationship. The
wife usually has no reason to question the honesty of her husband, and her refusal to sign
a joint return would either subject the marriage to unnecessary strains or expose the wife
to economic and moral pressure that would be hard to withstand, especially if the mone-
tary advantages at stake were significant. At a certain point, then, the voluntariness of a
joint return may be more illusory than real.
As a potential solution, one commentator has suggested that liability be apportioned
according to the income which each spouse actually reports on the joint return. 55 HAuv.
L. REV. 145 (1941). The reply to this, of course, is that the benefit that accrues to each
spouse because of the joint return does not strictly adhere to the amount of income that
each spouse reports. In addition, the joint and several liability condition serves to assure
the Government, to some extent at least, that the taxes will be paid.
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protecting disclosure of confidential communications between
husband and wife admittedly complicate the Government's prob-
lem.""2
Additionally, applying the "subjective" standard would not,
as the Government apparently believes, represent a significant
break from previous judicial interpretations of the statute. Al-
though no reported decisions have construed the "no reason to
know" phrase per se, the more flexible subjective approach does
comport with the relevant language in several decisions that have
considered section 6013(e).
In Mysse v. Commissioner,63 a case with facts similar to those
in Sanders, the taxpayer's husband had embezzled large sums of
money from the bank where he was employed and failed to report
these sums as gross income. The Commissioner argued that the
husband's expenditures were sufficiently unusual to cause the
spouse to have reason to know that income had been omitted from
the joint return. 4 After carefully reviewing the nature of the ex-
penditures, the Tax Court was of the opinion that they were "not
of such character as to cause a reasonably prudent person with
[the taxpayer-wife's] knowledge of the family finances to ques-
tion the source of the funds." 5 Indeed, the court repeatedly justi-
fied the taxpayer's assertion that she had no reason to know of
the omissions by noting her particular level of knowledge with
respect to the family's financial affairs and the intricate nature
62. O'Hara, Joint Responsibility for Joint Income Tax Returns: Options, Limitations
and Liabilities, N.Y.U. 26th INST. ON FED. TAX 111, 112 (1968).
63. 57 T.C. 680 (1972).
64. Id. at 697. The Commissioner pointed, for example, to the husband's purchase of
a new Oldsmobile and Jaguar in the year at issue, a $556 diamond ring for his wife, bills
at furniture and department stores, and college tuition payments.
65. 57 T.C. at 698-99. The Tax Court observed that:
[W]e see a family with two sons in college during most of the years in issue
and with the head of the family suffering from a terminal illness during at least
part of the period. We further see a family, residents in a small town. . . whose
spending habits raised not the least suspicion in a very interested observer-the
director, vice-president, and major stockholder of the bank [from which the
husband embezzled large sums of money]. Moreover, the head of the family,
Mysse, was evidently a master of deceit; he was able to embezzle hundreds of
thousands of dollars over a period of years without exciting the suspicion of
either the officers of the bank or its auditors. [The Government] has suggested
no reason why [the taxpayer] Patricia, a housewife without business knowl-
edge, should have known more about the bank's losses than these businessmen
having pecuniary or professional interests in the bank.
57 T.C. at 698.
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of the husband's illegal activities." The Mysse opinion, therefore,
lends at least indirect support to the subjective standard of care
interpretation applied in Sanders.67 The Mysse court also rejected
the Government's rigorous construction of the statutory prere-
quisites:
To be entitled to the benefits of section 6013(e) a spouse is not
required to have perfect knowledge of the family's finances; nor
is she required to see that the family maintains a balanced
budget .... 65
In Anderson v. Commissioner9 the taxpayer and her hus-
band had filed joint returns for 1969 and 1970. During those same
years the husband had embezzled sums of money from the com-
pany which employed him and failed to report the proceeds in the
joint return. In June, 1970, the husband was discharged from
employment under suspicion of embezzlement and in February,
1971, was indicted and convicted. The Tax Court held that the
taxpayer was relieved from liability under the Innocent Spouse
Act for 1969, but not for 1970.10 Although the taxpayer had no
actual knowledge of the embezzlement or of the omission in 1969,
the court concluded that the husband's discharge and subsequent
indictment and conviction for embezzlement in 1970 were "facts
within the taxpayer's knowledge from which a reasonably pru-
dent taxpayer under similar circumstances would have known of
the omission."71
66. 57 T.C. at 698-99. The court referred to the husband as a "master of deceit." Id.
Additionally, the court refuted numerous assumptions made by the Government regarding
the taxpayer's reason to know of the omitted income by emphasizing how it was under-
standable that she could have made contrary assumptions "in light of [her] knowledge"
of the family's finances. Id. at 699. This supports the subjective condition test applied in
Sanders.
67. Although the Fifth Circuit voiced some doubt as to the district court's ultimate
finding that the taxpayer in Sanders had satisfied her burden of establishing that she had
no knowledge or reason to know of the omissions, it did approve the district court's
application of the more liberal, subjective reasonable care standard under section
6013(e)(1)(B). 509 F.2d at 170. And, since there was no evidence that would have com-
pelled a finding against the taxpayer as a matter of law, the lower court's decision was
affirmed. Id.
68. 57 T.C. at 699.
69. 34 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 508 (1975).
70. During 1969 the standard of living for the taxpayer's family was in line with
reported income and only modest amounts were expended on travel, entertainment, gifts,
etc. The taxpayer placed her trust in her husband with regard to financial matters and
little was discussed with respect to such matters. Thus, she had no reason to know of the
omissions from gross income in 1969. Id.
71. Id. The Tax Court's opinion specifically refers to the taxpayer's reason to know
[Vol. 27
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Both Mysse and Anderson, therefore, represent an interpre-
tation of the innocent spouse statute that requires a subjective,
case-by-case analysis of the particular taxpayer's "reason to
know" of alleged omissions.2 The Sanders court merely made
explicit what was already implicit in Mysse and Anderson. In
determining whether a taxpayer had reason to know of omissions
of income under section 6013(e)(1)(B), courts should take each
taxpayer as they find him. If a reasonably prudent taxpayer, in
light of all the matters that were actually brought to the attention
of the taxpayer seeking relief, would have had no reason to know
of the omissions, then relief should be granted pursuant to section
6013(e).1
3 "
The Innocent Spouse Act represents an admirable effort by
the Congress to bring the administration of the tax laws into line
with our basic notions of fairness and justice .74 The decision of the
Fifth Circuit in Sanders is similarly laudable for its careful delin-
eation of the factors that should be considered in determining
what "justice" demands in a particular situation.75 In addition,
the Sanders decision serves to introduce increased harmony be-
tween the practicalities of modern marriages and the administra-
tive necessities of the Internal Revenue Code. Interpreted in the
light of experience, the innocent spouse statute should function
as an instrument of fairness whenever the tax laws seem to com-
pel an inequitable result. Indeed, after considering the applicabil-
ity of the innocent spouse statute an appellate court recently
added the exhortation that "[elven a tax collector should have
some heart.,6
William B. Chandler III
in light of the circumstances that were actually brought to her attention and which would
have caused a reasonably prudent person with a similar awareness of the circumstances
to have reason to know that items were being omitted from income. Id. Again, this implies
a subjective standard that hinges on a case-by-case analysis and, therefore, comports with
the Fifth Circuit's Sanders decision.
72. See notes 63-71 supra.
73. See the language of the Sanders court, 509 F.2d at 171, to the effect that the
ultimate determination of liability under section 6013(e) rests with the trier of fact, indi-
cating that each spouse's situation should be carefully and independently scrutinized.
74. S. REP. No. 91-1537, 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6089, 6091.
75. See note 46 supra.
76. Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1974).
1976]
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EVIDENCE-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-FEDERAL RULE OF EvI-
DENCE 803(18)-FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE ADMITTING LEARNED
TREATISES AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE MAY BE OF SIGNIFICANT LiTi-
GATIONAL IMPORTANCE, ESPECIALLY IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY SUITS.
Under rule 803(18)' of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2 liti-
gants in federal courts may now use learned treatises as proof of
the matters asserted therein, not merely as an impeachment tool
or as the basis of opinion in expert testimony.' As one of the many
exceptions to the hearsay rule, this rule, liberally construed, may
eventually prove to be of great litigational moment, especially in
products liability suits.
While commentary has generally been in agreement that
learned treatises comprise a trustworthy and accurate category of
evidence,4 courts have nevertheless excluded such evidence in the
past for reasons which often appear suspect.5 The use of learned
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(18) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:
Learned Treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness on
cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements con-
tained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history,
medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial
notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be
received as exhibits.
2. The Federal Rules of Evidence [hereinafter cited as FED. R. Ev.] became effective
in the federal court system on July 1, 1975. Act of Jan. 2, 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88
Stat. 1926, reported at 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2215 (1974). Rules 803 and 804
contain 30 different exceptions to the hearsay rule. See note 10 infra for a definition of
hearsay.
3. This comment will consider only the use of learned treatises as direct evidence of
the truth of matters asserted therein. Should the reader require more information as to
other uses of treatise evidence, see the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 803(18), Rules
of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 316-17 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee's Note]. See also 6 J. WIGMoRE, EVmNCE §
1700 (1940); 2 S.A. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 12.32 (6th ed. 1972); 1 E.C. CONRAD,
MODERN TRIAL EVIDENCE § 694 (1956). Because the uses of treatises in cross-examination
and to form the basis of expert opinion are tangentially related to the issue considered
here, brief discussion of those points are located at notes 47-57 infra and accompanying
text.
4. See, e.g., 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1690-92 (1940) [hereinafter cited as 6
WIGMORE]; 4 J.B. WEINSTEIN AND M.A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(18) [01-02]
(1975) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]; C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 321 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMcK].
5. Most courts do not permit the use of learned treatises as substantive evidence. See
6 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1696. However, fifteen of the states have provided in varying
22
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treatises as independent evidence, however, is not totally free of
potential prejudice; consequently, the Federal Rules contain
numerous safeguards against those dangers which may actually
exist.
Courts most often exclude learned treatises as direct evi-
dence on the basis that such evidence violates the hearsay rule7
without due regard to the reasons underlying the rule's existence.'
The hearsay rule was adopted to insure that only trustworthy,
accurate evidence be submitted for consideration to the trier of
fact by requiring that the declarant of a proffered statement be
subjected to the tripartite test of oath, presence in court and
cross-examination.9 The rule, however, has suffered significant
erosion over the years, as courts have become increasingly willing
to recognize that certain categories of evidence are subject to
factors containing equally effective guarantees of trustworthi-
degrees for the use of such publications. South Carolina and Massachusetts limit use to
particular types of cases. South Carolina has long permitted the use of treatise evidence
in any civil or criminal proceeding where "the question of sanity or insanity in the admin-
istration of poison or any other article destructive of life is involved . . . ." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 26-142 (1962). Additionally, Massachusetts permits the use of learned treatises as
direct evidence in medical malpractice cases. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233 § 79C (1959).
Seven states have enacted rather general statutes which permit the use of historical,
scientific, and art books to prove "facts of general notoriety and interest." CAUF. EvID.
CODE § 1341 (West 1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-402 (1948); IowA CODE ANN. § 622.23 (Cum.
Pamphlet 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-1101-8 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1218
(1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 41-670 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-6 (1953). Another seven
states have wide ranging provisions unhampered by narrow interpretations and
limitations. Stoudenmeier v. Wilson, 29 Ala. 567 (1857); Nordstrom v. White Metal Roll-
ing and Stamping Corp., 453 P.2d 619 (Wash. 1969); Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk
Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505 (1956); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (cc) (1963);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.255 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-803(18) (Supp. 4 1973).
6. See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1690.
7. FED. R. Ev. 801(c) defines hearsay in the following manner: "'Hearsay' is a state-
ment, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." The test for exclusion is stated in
FED. R. Ev. 802: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by an Act of
Congress."
8. A good example of mechanical application appears in the case of Yellow Bayou
Plantation, Inc. v. Shell Chemical, Inc., 491 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1974). Without consider-
ing the trustworthiness or relevance of the proffered evidence, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's refusal to admit an instruction manual: "[The manual] was pure hear-
say, offered not to show simply that it existed or [for some nonhearsay purpose] but
rather for the truth of the matter asserted, and was properly excluded." Id. at 1242.
9. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 245. A detailed analysis of the purposes and constitu-
tional implications of the hearsay rule is beyond the scope of this work. For a discussion
of those issues see 27 S.C.L. REV. 257 (1975) and authority cited therein.
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ness.'0
Generally, in the case of learned treatises, authoritativeness
is the primary guarantee of the trustworthiness.' Accuracy and
objectivity inhere in a work which the author knows will be the
subject of critical scrutiny among his peers.' 2 Since learned trea-
tises are written for the manifest purpose of adding to the body
of knowledge already extant on a particular subject, "it is reason-
able to assume . . . that [an] author has accurately presented
the matters with which he deals." 3 Rule 803(18) specifically pro-
vides that prior to its admission, the treatise must be "estab-
lished as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the
witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice."' 4
10. Dean Wigmore described this phenomena in the following words:
[The] circumstantial probability of trustworthiness is found in a variety of
circumstances sanctioned by judicial practice, and it is usually from one of these
salient circumstances that [an] exception [will take] its name. There is no
comprehensive attempt to secure uniformity in the degree of trustworthiness
which these circumstances presuppose. It is merely that common sense and
experience have from time to time pointed them out as practically adequate
substitutes for the ordinary test, at least, in view of the necessity of the situa-
tion.
5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1422 (Chadboum ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 5 WIGMORE].
11. See the Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3.
12. Wigmore justified this conclusion by stating that:
[The writer of a learned treatise] knows that every conclusion will be subjected
to careful professional criticism, and is open ultimately to certain refutation if
not well founded; that his reputation depends on the correctness- of his data and
the validity of his conclusions; and that he might better not have written than
put forth statements in which may be detected a lack of sincerety of method
and of accuracy of results.
6 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1692(b). See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 803(18)[01] at
803-215; 66 MICH. L. REV. 183, 188 (1967).
13. Comment, Learned Treatises as Direct Evidence: The Alabama Experience, 67
DUKE L.J. 1169, 1188 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 67 DUKE L.J.]. In this article a detailed
study of Alabama's long experience with a liberal learned treatise exception was con-
ducted. Questionaires were sent to the members of the Alabama Bar requesting their
opinions and suggestions concerning the exception. The published results of the study
constitute an important source for many of the propositions presented herein.
14. See note 1 supra. It should be noted that the authoritativeness of a treatise is not
an adjudicative fact and, therefore, would not be subject to FED. R. Ev. 201. See Advisory
Committee's Note, supra note 3, 56 F.R.D. at 201-05. But see WEINSTEIN, supra note 4,
803(18)[02] at 803-222, where the authors seemingly assume that judicial notice of a
treatise's authoritativeness is subject to rule 201. Such a conclusion, however, does not
seem supportable in light of the Advisory Committee's Note. It is stated that adjudicative
facts "are simply the facts of the particular case," to include (citing 2 ADMImSTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 353) facts -which "relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their
business." However, facts used in "deciding whether evidence should be admitted" were
termed "essentially non-adjudicative in nature." 56 F.R.D. at 202-05. The Committee's
24
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss4/10
LEARNED TREATISES
Furthermore, it appears that the treatise is likely to be more
reliable and accurate than an expert appearing on the stand, even
if that expert is the one who happened to author the treatise.
Logically, it would seem that a work written in the environment
of science at a time when the writer's sole objective was to pro-
duce a qualitatively definitive work would be less susceptible
than would an expert witness to the intrusions and diversions of
the witness stand." At the time a treatise is written, its author
presumably would have no interest in the outcome of a particular
trial which at that time depends upon fate for its occurrence. 6
The same may not be said with certainty about the expert com-
pensated to testify at the trial, whether he is the author or not."
Closely related to the standard hearsay rationale is the argu-
ment that treatises are not admissible because they are com-
prised of hearsay upon hearsay and are not based entirely "upon
the author's personal investigation and observation of the
facts."'" However, rule 803(18)'s requirement of a finding of au-
thoritativeness satisfies this objection as well. 9 Moreover, the
objection seems inconsequential when one considers that most
live expert testimony is usually no more than a compilation of the
views of others, and thus itself is no more than hearsay upon
hearsay. In other words, it seems illogical to allow testimony from
experts who have acquired their expertise through the study of
the works of others and yet refuse to admit the published studies
from which such expertise is usually derived."
Note concludes that "the use of nonevidence facts in evaluating the adjudicative facts of
the case is not an appropriate subject for formalized judicial notice treatment," thereby
allowing the crucial determination to depend purely upon judicial common sense and
experience. 56 F.R.D. at 204.
15. 66 MICH. L. REv. at 189.
16. 67 DUKE L.J., supra note 13, at 1188.
17. Wigmore emphasizes this reality by noting that
[Treatise writers] may have a bias in favor of a theory, but it is a bias in favor
of the truth as they see it; it is not a bias in favor of a lawsuit or an individual.
Their statement is made with no view to a litigation or to the interests of a
litigable affair .... [However, the] abuses of experttestimony arising from
the fact such witnesses are too often in effect paid to take a partisan view and
are practically untrustworthy, are too well-known to repeat.
6 WIOMORE, supra note 4, § 1692 (citation omitted).
18. 66 MICH. L. REV. at 187.
19. Moreover, FEn. R. Ev. 805, entitled 'Hearsay within Hearsay,' dispenses with the
objection: "Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each
part of the combined statement conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided
in these rules." As a result, the Federal Rules implicitly recognize that an assertion of
hearsay upon hearsay is not, ipso facto, enough to exclude otherwise reliable evidence.
20. Weinstein and Berger address this point and conclude that
1976]
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The objection that treatises may be untrustworthy because
they are out-dated is just as dubious as the prior two objections."
However, this objection
is answered by the fact that [rule 803(18) requires] a prelimi-
nary showing that the treatise is reliable, that the adversary
system ensures that the opponent of the evidence will produce
proof of its obsolescence if this is so, and that treatises can be
expected to be more au courant than expert witnesses who may
be reluctant to abandon theories learned in school.22
Another objection to the admissibility of learned treatises
is that because "opinions of authors on the same subject may
differ radically," admission of such evidence may result in a "bat-
tle of the books" between the parties.2 3 Such a conclusion, how-
ever, has never been empirically supported. In fact, available
evidence on the subject supports an opposite conclusion;2" and
because "[r]esort to treatises is undoubtedly cheaper, probably
less time-consuming, and interferes far less with the work the
expert could be doing out of court," a "battle of the books" seems
preferable to "the very real and frequently encountered 'battles
of the experts.' "25
Not all objections to the learned treatise exception dissipate
so quickly under analysis. For those which do not, however, the
Federal Rules provide satisfactory answers. Since treatises often
may be very technical and difficult to understand, they are sus-
ceptible to misuse and misapplication by the trier of fact.2 Re-
lated to this danger is the possibility that a treatise written for
one purpose may contain imprecise language; and although the
giving treatises a substantive effect accords with the realities of actual practice.
All experts rely in large measure, and acquire their expertise, through familiar-
ity with work published by the recognized authorities in their field. As Morgan
says, "it is absurd to listen to testimony based upon assertions by the treatise
writer while refusing to admit the assertion."
WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 803(18)[011 at 803-217 (footnotes and citations omitted).
21. 6 WIwMORE, supra note 4, § 1690(2).
22. WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 803(18)[01] at 803-215 (footnote omitted).
23. 67 DUKE L.J., supra note 13, at 1190.
24. Id. The Duke study produced the following results:
a. greatest number of books submitted by both sides in one case-30.
b. greatest number of books submitted by one side in one case-18.
c. average number for both sides-2 to 3.
d. average number for one side-1 to 2.
25. WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 803(18)[01] at 803-216 (footnotes omitted).
26. See the Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, 56 F.R.D. at 316; 67 DuKE L.J.,
supra note 13, at 1187.
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imprecision may have no detrimental effect when the treatise is
used for its intended purpose, it may become a focal point in the
courtroom, thereby causing the treatise to become "of questiona-
ble evidentiary value." 27
Both weaknesses have been erased in large part, if not com-
pletely, by the requirement of rule 803(18) that the offering party
have an expert available in court to explain technical language
and to clarify vague material. 28 Further protection is provided by
the rule in permitting the treatise only to be read into the record
and not to be tendered to the jury for consideration. 29 Of course,
in a situation in which the treatise is so vague as to be manifestly
untrustworthy, the court, in its discretion, may exclude it upon
that basis."
There is a further danger that the offering party may not
fairly and accurately represent the author's thesis.31 Such a possi-
bility has been minimized to the point of acceptability by two
factors. First, the offering party may be required to make the
entire treatise, and not just a copy of an excerpt therefrom, avail-
able to the court and the opposite party. 2 Second, along with this
right to inspect, the opposition may always attack the treatise
27. 66 MIcH. L. REv. at 187.
28. See note 1 supra and the Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, 56 F.R.D. at
316.
29. See note 28 supra.
30. If complexity or vagueness is such as to call the relevancy of a treatise into doubt,
FED. R. Ev. 402 empowers a judge to exclude it on that basis. Relevant evidence is defined
in rule 401 as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Additional protection is provided by rule 403 which
allows that: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of. . .confusion of the issues. . . or misleading the
jury .... "
31. 67 DUKE L.J., supra note 13, at 1187.
32. 6 WioMoRE, supra note 4, § 1692(2). Assuming that a learned treatise is a "writ-
ing," rule 107 provides that when "a part [of a writing] is introduced by a party, an
adverse party may require him at that time to introduce any other part . . . ." Rule
1001(1) defines a writing as consisting "of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent,
set down by. . printing . . . ." It makes no difference whether the treatise is termed
an original (rule 1001(3)) or a duplicate (rule 1001(4)), insofar as duplicates offered to
prove the writing's contents are admissible under rule 1003 so long as the writing is
authenticated and no unfairness would result from not offering the original. Because rule
902(6) expressly does away with the requirement that extrinsic evidence need not be
offered to authenticate a periodical, most other forms of treatise evidence should receive
equally liberal treatment. In any case, compliance with rule 901, which requires authenti-
cation, should be satisfied by rule 803(18)'s required finding of authoritativeness. Rule
901(b)(1) allows authentication by testimony "that a matter is what it is claimed to be."
27
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through expert testimony or other treatises."
A final objection which may be raised is that of un-
fair surprise. Methods of discovery permitted in the federal
courts constitute a more than adequate safeguard against such a
danger. 4 Only in situations where diligent preparation would not
afford the desired protection should the court provide extra relief.
For instance, in a particularly complex case, the offering party
may be required to inform its opposition several days prior to trial
of treatise evidence which is to be used;3" or during trial the court
may grant the opposition a delay in which to prepare a defense
against the same."6
Cognizance of the reliability of treatise evidence is not, in
itself, enough to insure that rule 803(18) will receive the degree
of applicability intended by the drafters. The wording of the rule
contains several crucial ambiguities which could lead a court to
emasculate it through overly restrictive application. This concern
becomes clear through analysis of Bair v. American Motors
Corp.3" in which rule 803(18) was prematurely considered in dicta
and which also serves notice of other problems inhering in the
application of the rule.
33. 67 DuKE L.J., supra note 13, at 1189-90, where it is stated that:
Even live testimony is subject to an unfair presentation by virtue of what is or
is not disclosed, yet the adversary system is deemed a sufficient safeguard for
eliciting truth and impeaching the credibility of experts who do not give accur-
ate testimony.
The above passage was quoted approvingly in WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 803(18)[01] at
803-216. See also 6 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1690(4).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. . . including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things ....
Similarly, a defendant may obtain discovery of treatise evidence to be used by the govern-
ment under FED. R. CRum. P. 16(b); however, the government may obtain such discovery
only in the event that the court has granted relief to the defendant under rule 16(b). See
FED. R. CRIu. P. 16(c).
35. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233 §79C (1959), which provides that in order to
use a medical treatise, the offering party must give the opposition 30 days notice prior to
trial.
36. The Advisory Committee considered the objection of unfair surprise in its com-
mentary to rule 403 (see note 33 supra) and concluded that "[w]hile it can scarcely be
doubted that claims of unfair surprise may still be justified despite procedural require-
ments of notice and instrumentalities of discovery, the granting of a continuance is a more
appropriate remedy than exclusion of the evidence." 56 F.R.D. at 218-19 (citation omit-
ted).
37. 473 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1973).
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In Bair the plaintiff was injured in a collision during which
she was thrown from an automobile manufactured by the defen-
dant. She sued both in negligence and strict liability claiming
that her injuries were caused by the improper design of the door
latch in her car. In support of her contention, she sought during
the testimony of her expert witness to introduce "the results of
statistical studies conducted by Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory,
Inc., Automotive Crash Injury Research."" The trial court ex-
cluded the studies on the ground that since the plaintiff's expert
had not participated in the studies, any of his testimony there-
from would be objectionable hearsay. The Third Circuit reversed
and remanded for retrial because, in its view, since such evidence
had been admitted before in federal courts as a basis for expert
opinion,39 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) required admis-
sion of the excluded evidence." Of importance, however, is the
fact that since the court believed that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence would be adopted on July 1, 1973, and since the trial on
remand might not be completed until after that date, the court
felt compelled to comment that rule 803(18) would dictate the
same result.4"
38. Id. at 741.
39. Id. at 743. In support of this conclusion the court cited Western Assurance Co. v.
J.H. Mohlman Co., 83 F. 811, 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 168 U.S. 710 (1897), (statistics
and tabulations appearing in a government report and two reference books may be read
into record by expert in support of his opinion) and Woelfie v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 103 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1939) (expert permitted to cite result of experiments conducted
by others). 473 F.2d at 743.
40. 473 F.2d at 743-45. At the time Bair was decided, FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) read as
follows:
Form and Admissibility. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken
orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules. All evidence shall
be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or
under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States
on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the
courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is
held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence
governs and the evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient
method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein
made. The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like man-
ner.
The rule, however, was amended by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972 to read:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the Federal Rules
of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. ...
The amendment became effective on July 1, 1975. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2071 (1 New Laws
and Court Construction 654 (Feb. 1975)).
41. 473 F.2d at 744.
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The first problem to surface in Bair is that the court was not
entirely certain of what type of publication would constitute a
learned treatise.2 Resort to case law in other jurisdictions and to
the commentators was of no help in clarifying the Bair ambigu-
ity.43 Because the efficacy of a rule permitting admission depends,
in the first instance, upon courts having a clear understanding of
the category of evidence which is to be admitted, the following
standard is suggested as a workable one:
Learned Treatises-'. . . [authoritative], informed, [and cur-
rent publications, to include books, periodicals, and pamphlets
which] provide in a systematic manner and for an expository
and [indicative] purpose methodical discussions of the facts
and principles involved and conclusions reached. . . on a sub-
ject of history, medicine, or other science or art.'44
42. Although the study approved was a learned treatise (see notes 43-44 infra), the
court's reliance on Western Assurance was at least partially incorrect in that the govern-
ment report used there was not a treatise. This fact is borne out by FED. R. Ev. 803(8)
which, in creating an exception for such reports, provides in pertinent part: "[R]eports
• ..or data compilation, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth. . . (B)
matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law. . .[are not excluded by the hearsay
rule]." Additionally, Weinstein and Berger instruct, "when the statement contains an
undisputed fact there may be some overlap with Rule 803(17). If the trial judge finds that
the data in question does not require elucidation he should allow permission pursuant to
rule 803(17) so that an expert witness need not be called." WEINSTEIN, supra note 4,
803(18)[02] at 803-222.
43. The one court to attempt to resolve the ambiguity unfortunately vitiated the
exception followed in that state and several others having a similar provision. In Califor-
nia, litigants have long been permitted to use "historical works and books of science or
art . .. [to prove] facts of general notoriety and interest." CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1341
(West 1966). The problems in application arose in determining what were "facts of general
notoriety and interest." In Gallagher v. Market St. Ry., 67 Cal. 13, 6 P. 869 (1885), the
California Supreme Court confronted that exact issue and concluded:
We think the terms stand for facts of a public nature, either at home or abroad,
not existing in the memory of men as contradistinguished from facts of a private
nature existing within the knowledge of living men, and as to which they may
be examined as witnesses. It is of such public facts, including historical facts,
facts of the exact sciences, and of literature or art, when relevant to a cause,
that. . . proof may be made by books of standard authority.
67 Cal. at 15, 6 P. at 871. By limiting the exception to books presenting facts not within
the memory of a living man and facts of the exact sciences, the court, in effect, excluded
the great majority of treatise evidence; moreover, the definition has been followed, and
thus has had a similar effect, in several other states following the rule. See, e.g., Van Skike
v. Potter, 53 Neb. 28, 73 N.W. 295 (1897); Ecklebury v. Kaiser Foundation Northern
Hosps., 226 Ore. 616, 359 P.2d 1090 (1961).
The commentators have likewise been of no help in specifying a definition. WORDS
AND PHRASES does no more than specify that a government report (see note 42 supra) will
not be admitted "where the facts are not generally accepted and the opinions expressed
therein are partisan." 24A WORDS AND PHRASES 235 (1966) (citation omitted).
44. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, LATEST UNABRIDGED 2435
(1965). 30
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Primarily, the proffered definition is designed to be compati-
ble with both the wording and purposes of rule 803(18). In so far
as harmony with the rule's wording is concerned, the definition
incorporates the subject matter description for which treatise
evidence will be admissible and the requirement of authorita-
tiveness. It also makes clear that a work need not be a textbook
in order to be considered a treatise. The proposal is designed,
as well, to insure that only trustworthy material be considered.
Authoritativeness and timeliness are the primary requisites of
this goal. In addition, the requirement that "methodical dis-
cussions" be provided "in a systematic manner" is included in
order to insure that material is presented according to the
standards recognized in a particular field and in a way not vague
nor subject to deceptive manipulation.
Secondly, the definition proposes to discourage overly re-
strictive interpretation. Neither the subject matter nor the
printed form of treatises is strictly limited nor was an effort made
to rigidify the manner, purpose, or form of discussion. In the
latter regard, conformance to the standard may be determined in
the same manner allowable under rule 803(18) in making a find-
ing of authoritativeness or may be presumed from that finding.45
In applying the definition, as in applying the rule, "trial judges
should not destroy the exception by insisting upon a quantum of
proof that the proponent cannot meet."4 6
The second potential problem evidenced by Bair is that
courts may incorrectly interpret rule 803(18) as standing for the
45. It should be remembered, of course, that the final decision as to admissibility lies
within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See note 30 supra. Rigid application of the
standard, however, should be employed only when the party opposing admission arouses
substantial doubt as to the ability of the proffered treatise to conform. In the absence of
such a doubt, a finding of authoritativeness by either party's experts or by judicial notice
should ordinarily be taken to include compliance with the standard. To proceed in such
a manner makes sense because a determination of admissibility is not a determination of
the weight to be accorded a treatise by the jury. In other words, a court should not
"instruct the jury to accept the treatise as authoritative, but [should] leave its weight
for the jury to determine based upon the evidence and comments of counsel and the
court." WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 803(18)[02] at 803-222.
46. WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 803(18)[02] at 803-222. Dean Wigmore buttresses this
warning by explaining:
The needless obstruction to investigation of truth by the hearsay rule is due
mainly to the inflexibility of its exceptions to the rigidly technical construction
of those exceptions by the courts; and to the enforcement of the rule when its
contravention would do no harm, but would assist in obtaining a complete
understanding of the transaction.
5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1427 (citation omitted).
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proposition that learned treatises are admissible not as indepen-
dent evidence but only to form the basis of opinion of a testifying
expert." Because the rule aspires to be a mechanism by which
trustworthy and needed evidence, otherwise excludable under the
hearsay rule, could be admitted," it would be absurd to limit
47. The court stated in Bair that the "permitted use [of treatises in rule 803(18)] is
precisely that approved in Western Assurance Co. v. J.H. Mohlman Co., supra and Woel-
fie v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., supra." 473 F.2d at 745. For a description
of the cited cases, see note 42 supra. However, in both cases treatises were admitted into
evidence in order to support the opinion of a testifying expert. Neither case made any
pronouncement that treatise evidence was to be accorded independent weight in its own
right. See Western Assurance Co. v. J.H. Mohlman Co., 83 F. at 821 and Woelfle v.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 F.2d at 418-19. Moreover, in a footnote to Bair, the
Third Circuit stated, "This case does not involve independent use of learned treatises as
evidence of the truth therein asserted, rather than as a basis of opinion of an expert." 473
F.2d at 743 (citations omitted).
48. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 4, §§ 1691-92; WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 803(18)[1]. One
author, however, has reached the questionable conclusion that the federal rule neither
requires that the evidence be needed nor provides sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.
See Note, Learned Treatises and Rule 803(b)(18) of the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 126 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 5 VAL. U.L. Rv.]. There, after
it is correctly noted that rule 803(18) does not expressly state that the evidence be needed
and that to be admissible, statements in treatises need only be at least as good as they
would be if stated in court by the author, the article concludes that rule 803(18) abrogates
any requirement of necessity. Id. at 136-37. The author continues by stating that even
if the requirement of necessity could be implied, the type of necessity-costs and incon-
venience of producing the treatise writer or other expert-is partisan oriented and "not
grounded on obtaining the best evidence available." Id. at 141-44. The principal fault of
this argument is that it does not appraise the realities of the evidentiary situation. That
the rule is not designed to secure the best evidence obtainable does not follow either from
the fact that the statement need only be as good as live testimony or from the fact that
the claimed necessity is partisan in nature. The choice between an expert and a treatise
is, and must be, made by counsel; obviously, a court should not be expected to determine
whether the treatise evidence is the best obtainable because such a determination would
require analysis in detail and beforehand of both sides of the case and the relative logistics
and expenses involved. Rule 803(18), by not explicitly requiring that there be no better
evidence available, implicitly recognizes that counsel are best qualified to evaluate pres-
entable evidence and to select the best.
In view of that reality, to say that rule 803(18) is not directed toward presentation of
the best available evidence would lead to absurd results. By implication, the rule allows
counsel to make a choice. To say that counsel would choose to employ treatise evidence
when suitable expert testimony is available (i.e., amenable to summons and not prohibi-
tively expensive) is to say either that treatise evidence is inherently preferable or that jury-
manipulation through use of treatises would likely produce better results than the sub-
stantive effect of expert testimony. Acceptance of the former result would logically extend
the argument to the conclusion that treatises are the best evidence or to the absurd
conclusion that in every situation where a treatise was chosen, counsel's preference was
misplaced. The Duke study, however, reflected that, "[g]iven a rough equivalence in the
respective authority of the witness and the author, it was the opinion of almost all the
attorneys questioned that the expert on the stand enjoys a decided superiority over the
treatise." 67 DUKE L.J., supra note 13, at 1176 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It
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seems reasonable to conclude that the use of treatise evidence would be resorted to only
in the absence of suitable expert testimony or to supplement it, rather than in lieu thereof.
See 67 DUKE L.J. at 1178.
A conclusion that any opportunity to manipulate the jury inhering in the use of
treatises is more valuable than expert testimony would be hard to substantiate and in any
event is contradicted by the empirical evidence of the Duke study. As shall be developed
in analysis of the Valparaiso article's conclusion that treatises are not sufficiently trust-
worthy, the federal rules and the adversary system provide ample safeguards to prevent
abuse of the rule.
The article ends its discussion of necessity by concluding that the degree of need for
treatise evidence is "minimal and exception, therefore, should be allowed only after a
demonstration of a high degree of trustworthiness." 5 VAL. U.L. REv. at 144. This needed
high degree of trustworthiness, asserts the author, is not present in learned treatises. He
attempts to support his assertion through consideration of several of the dangers which
may exist in the use of treatises, but in so doing remains blissfully unaware both of the
cogent arguments belittling those problems and of the protection afforded by the rules.
First, it is stated that rule 803(18) is deficient because it does not expressly provide that
partisan, self-serving documents are not to be used. Id. at 145. What is not recognized is
that the decision as to admissibility belongs to the court and not to the rule. In making
that decision a trial judge should insure, among other things, that the treatise is learned.
See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra. It is highly unlikely that a work written
with a view toward litigation would pass this muster, and it is just as unlikely that
opposing counsel will not be able to expose the bias through the use of experts or other
treatises. The mere fact that a rule fails to articulate obvious duties of both lawyer and
judge should not be seriously taken to detract from its efficacy.
Second, it is stated that ill-founded conclusions might not be refuted at trial, that
challenged conclusions will create a controversy which a jury is incapable of resolving, and
that the requirement of authoritativeness will not always provide protection, since even
the authorities sometimes differ. 5 VAL. U.L. REv. at 145. To the first part of the statement
Wigmore would answer that just as it is within counsel's ability to bring one expert to the
stand to oppose another, so too can he oppose a statement from a book; moreover, should
the mere possibility of non-refutation be considered enough to exclude evidence, such a
practice of exclusion "would if consistently applied exclude all testimony even on the
stand from scientific witnesses." See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1690. To the second part,
the federal rules offer protection by allowing the judge to exclude misleading and confus-
ing evidence (FED. R. Ev. 403) and by requiring the presence of an expert to simplify
confusing language (FED. R. Ev. 803(18)). Providing such simplicity to the controversy and
requiring authoritativeness in the offered works disposes of the final part of the statement.
Though disagreement among the authorities does sometimes occur, it is the exception and
not the rule. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1690. Authority may be reliably admitted to
counter opposing authority, with the question of the weight to be accorded to each left to
the jury. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, 803(18)[02] at 803-222.
Third, the article asserts that rule 803(18) does not go far enough toward insuring
against misuse and misapplication by the trier of fact, because the treatise may be subject
to different interpretations by different experts or because experts chosen to affirm author-
itativeness may not be experts in the field of the treatise. What is not noted is that rule
403 permits exclusion for misleading the jury and for unfair prejudice, defined in the
Advisory Committee's Note as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis." Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, 56 F.R.D. at 218. Additionally, an
expert's qualifications are subject to attack. See FED. R. Ev. 602, 702.
Finally, it is contended that treatises are not sufficiently reliable because they are
sometimes based upon the dynamic and unsettled "inexact sciences." 5 VAL. U.L. REv.
at 147. Dean Wigmore rejected this contention by noting:
There is ignorant exaggeration in these charges. They attribute to the entire
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admission in such a manner." More importantly, such evidence
is often needed and valuable precisely because it represents the
opinion of another, and perhaps more authoritative, expert than
the one testifying on the stand." In any case, such a limitation
would render the rule ineffectual inasmuch as any instruction to
the effect that a treatise should be considered only to determine
the weight to be given expert testimony, and not independently
as proof of matters asserted therein, would likely have no effect
upon a jury.5'
Alternatively, Bair may be interpreted as stating that trea-
tises are admissible as independent evidence, but only when they
have been relied upon by a testifying expert in the formation of
his opinion.52 This interpretation, like the preceding one, seems
to be grounded in the language of rule 803(18) where it is stated
that treatises are admissible "[t]o the extent called to the atten-
tion of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon
by him in direct examination."53 When considered in light of the
Advisory Committee's Note to the exception and rule 702, some-
thing less restrictive seems to have been intended and to be more
plausible.
body of scientific knowledge the instability due to casual rapid progress in
certain departments of the sciences; and they ignore even in those departments
the small proportion which the field of possible change bears to the large area
of established truth . . . .For if these works are rejected because they may not
embody the latest results of science, what shall be said of specialist witnesses
in general? . . .[C]ould it seriously occur to anyone to exclude all experts from
the stand . . . because many among the whole body may not [be acquainted
with all the most recent changes in the field]?
6 WMORE, supra note 4, § 1690 (emphasis in original).
49. The Bair court, in spite of what else it said about the use of treatises, correctly
recognized that the contention "[ihat courts must, on hearsay grounds, be deprived of
the use of the collected data on which other departments of government, industry, and
the [professions] obviously rely, makes no . . .sense . . . ." 473 F.2d at 744.
50. Wigmore concludes:
there are certain matters upon which the conclusions of two or three leaders in
the scientific world are always preeminently desirable; and it is highly unsatis-
factory that, except in the region where they may happen to live, the opinions
of world famous investigators should have no standing of their own.
6 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1691 (footnote omitted). Additionally, it has been noted that
"in a case where the bias of [an] ...expert may effectively be brought out on cross
examination by the opposing counsel, the impartiality of the text writer serves to offset
the 'natural' effectiveness of live testimony." 67 DUKE L.J., supra note 13, at 1177 (foot-
note omitted).
51. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 4, T 803(18)[01] at 803-217. See also Comments to
Rule 63(31) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
52. See 473 F.2d at 744-45 (quoting Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, 56
F.R.D. at 349.
53. See note 1 supra. (emphasis added). 34
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Since the rule would clearly allow treatise evidence to come
in on cross-examination, regardless of whether it was relied upon
by either side's experts in the formation of their opinions,54 no
reason suggests itself for requiring that it form the basis of the
opinion of an expert testifying on direct. First, the rule does not
limit the use of treatises in cross-examination to impeach or to
any other specified purpose." Second, an expert who has used the
treatise in the formation of his opinion might be expected to
provide a more slanted and, hence, less reliable interpretation of
it." Third, the requirement that an expert's opinion be based
upon the treatise can be rendered ineffectual. For instance, a
party seeking admission of the evidence, but unable to find or to
afford an expert whose opinion was based thereupon, need only
wait until cross-examination of the opposition's expert in order to
call the pertinent portions to his attention and read them into the
record.57 Fourth, the only reason cited in the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note for requiring the presence of an expert on the stand at
the time of the treatise's admission is to shield against the dan-
gers of misapplication and misuse by the trier of fact.58 No re-
quirement appears that an expert be thoroughly conversant with
the work, only that he be able to explain it and aid in its applica-
tion, "if desired."59 Fifth, the cited authority for the rule militates
against either possible Bair interpretation." Finally, rule 702 ex-
plicitly recognizes that experts may testify for reasons other than
the mere statement of an opinion, to include explanation and
assistance in application of relevant evidence."1
54. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, 56 F.R.D. at 317.
55. Id.
56. See note 17 supra.
57. See Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, 56 F.R.D. at 317.
58. Id. at 316.
59. Id.
60. The Committee cited MCCORMICK, supra note 4; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 366 (1962); WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1692; City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala.
603, 188 So. 264; Lewandoski v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 146 N.W.2d 505
(1966); 66 MICH. L. REV. 183 (1967); Uniform Rules of Evidence 63(31); and KAN. CIv. PRO.
STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (cc) (Vernon 1963). None of these sources require that an expert rely
on the treatise in the formation of his opinion.
61. FED. R. Ev. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
In explanation, the Advisory Committee stated:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of opinions.
1976] 779
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There being little doubt that the restrictive interpretations
hinted at in Bair were unintended by the drafters of rule 803(18),
it remains only to provide a plausible meaning to the troublesome
language. In giving leave to the court to admit a treatise only
"[t]o the extent . . . relied upon" by an expert on direct, the
rule should be read to contemplate no more than that use of the
treatise be limited to those parts thereof read into the record
while the expert is on the stand and relied upon by him in affirm-
ing authoritativeness, in explaining the treatise to the trier of
fact, or in assisting the trier of fact in applying the treatise to the
facts of the case.2
Because only a minority of jurisdictions have adopted any
sort of learned treatise exception,13 one might be tempted to view
skeptically the assertion that the rule is of great potential import-
ance. It may be extremely likely that in the vast majority of
situations, an expert whose opinion is at least partially based
upon a treatise may be located; however, if it is accepted that
learned treatises are trustworthy and that the opinions of treatise
writers are of evidentiary moment in their own right, the Bair
problems assume added significance. That treatise evidence is a
potentially valuable tool and that such evidence may be, in some
instances, the best or only available becomes apparent through
consideration of Hickock v. G.D. Searle & Co.64
In Hickock, the plaintiff brought, inter alia, a cause of action
in strict liability, alleging that the use of the contraceptive pill,
Ovulen 21, induced blood clotting in her brain which, in turn,
resulted in the scarring of brain tissue. This scarring allegedly
formed a focal point for brain irritation that resulted in epilepsy.
The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes that an
expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other
principles relevant to the case.
Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, 56 F.R.D. at 282.
62. A further hint that such a meaning was actually intended appears in the Advisory
Committee's Note to rule 803(18). There, in speaking of the introduction of treatise evi-
dence on cross examination, the Committee states, "The rule does not require that the
witness rely upon. . . the treatise as authoritative. . ." 56 F.R.D. at 317. The inference
to be drawn from this language is that if a treatise is introduced in direct examination,
the testifying expert should consider it reliable before explaining or applying it. Thus, the
words "relied upon" found in the rule should be taken to require no more than that the
expert have either affirmed the work's authoritativeness himself or accepted affirmance
provided by another. The words "to the extent" should be viewed as a limitation on the
statements in the treatise which might be used-e.g., only to those introduced while the
expert was on the stand.
63. See note 5 supra.
64. 496 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1974).
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At trial she sought to introduce into evidence an article from the
New England Journal of Medicine which purported to demon-
strate that the occurrence of such clots in women taking oral
contraceptives was increased nine times over women who did not.
In excluding such evidence, the Tenth Circuit ruled that such
articles were hearsay and, as such, were admissible only to form
the basis of expert testimony and not as proof of the truth of
matters asserted therein.
Problems of proof in drug cases such as Hickock are often
severe, even when the cause of action sounds in strict liability.
Under that theory plaintiff is confronted with three distinct bur-
dens, each attended by its own complex set of problems." First,
he must establish that the injury-producing product was defec-
tive at the time it left the hands of the defendant.6 Use of a drug
may involve a number of risks and dangers; yet, the drug may not
be classified defective for the purpose of fixing liability. Such
drugs may be unavoidably unsafe; but when weighed against the
seriousness of the illness sought to be remedied, their production
and marketing may be justifiable, "notwithstanding the
unavoidably high degree of risk which they involve."6 Thus,
plaintiff must establish either that the risks could and should
have been avoided or that, if unavoidable, they were not justifia-
ble. Since a defendant may not be held liable for injuries resulting
from a drug which was safe at the time it left his control, plaintiff
has the collateral responsibility of proving, for each and every
party sued, that the defect, in fact, did exist at that time."
Second, plaintiff must prove that the condition which made
the product defective was a cause of the injury out of which his
case arose. 9 A drug may be defective in a variety of ways; none-
theless, plaintiff must establish which defect was the cause. 0
65. It should be remembered that this discussion of the elements of a cause of action
in strict liability is very basic and is not intended to be definitive in effect nor is the
exposition of problems in proof designed to be exhaustive on the subject. Rather, the
information which is presented is calculated only to alert one of the potential importance
of treatise evidence, especially in a products liability case.
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Note § 402A, comment g at
351 (hereinafter cited as § 402A).
67. Id., comment k at 353-54.
68. Id., comment g at 351. See also McNamara v. American Motors Corp., 247 F.2d
445 (5th Cir. 1957).
69. P. Keeton, Liability of Drug Manufacturers, in DRUG LIABIIrrY LITIGATION 45, 48-
49 (Practicing Law Institute, N.Y.C. 1970) (hereinafter cited as Keeton).
70. S. L. Birnbaum, Defense of a Drug Liability Action, in DRUG LIABILITY LITIGATION
25, 27 (Practicing Law Institute, N.Y.C. 1973). See also A. Goth, Recognizing Drug
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Moreover, the relative impossibility of demonstrating exact caus-
ation may require that proof be made circumstantially." The net
effect of this situation is to provide defendant with a particularly
strong defense-alternative causation. 2 In reality, "[a]nything
is theoretically possible when dealing with drugs, until dis-
proven." 3 Plaintiff at the outset, then, must work diligently not
only to amass evidence supportive of his theory but also to collect
data discounting alternative theories of causation.
Finally, plaintiff must show that his particular injury was
the risk or hazard, or one of the risks or hazards, that made the
drug defective. 4 There exists a very real possibility that a drug
manufacturer may not be held liable, even though its drug was
defective and the cause of plaintiff's injury. Drug side-effects fall
into three general categories-toxic, allergic, and idiosyncratic. 5
Toxic reactions generally include all unintended effects not fall-
ing into either one of the other two categories and are the usual
source of liability to the manufacturer. 6 On the other hand, a
manufacturer may not be held liable for allergic reactions against
which proper warning has been given." Finally, some injuries are
so rare, completely unforeseeable, and freakish in nature as to
make it unfair to hold the manufacturer liable. 8
Certain other problems arise regardless of which particular
element of the cause of action plaintiff is seeking to establish.
Should the reader still be unconvinced that strict liability may
Injuries, in DRUG LIABILITY LITIGATION 9-10 (Practicing Law Institute, N.Y.C. 1970) (here-
inafter cited as Goth).
71. One explanation for this situation is that: "Every drug in order to produce the
desired effect must produce a chemical reaction, The exact mechanism of the reactions
are generally unknown. A similar statement may be made concerning drug reactions that
lead to injuries." L.S. Goldsmith, Types of Drug Injuries, in DRUG IJABmLrPY LTIGAToN 7,
9 (Practicing Law Institute, N.Y.C. 1973) (hereinafter cited as Goldsmith).
72. Some courts have, to a degree, abrogated this defense by requiring the defendant
to prove, rather than merely allowing him to raise, the defense. See Lechuga, Inc. v.
Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256, 262 (1970). But see P.D. Rheingold, Liability
of Manufacturer, Physicians and Others; Administrative Developments; Current Litiga-
tion; Sources; Factors in Choosing Defendants, in DRUG LIABILTY LMGATION 13, 19 (Prac-
ticing Law Institute, N.Y.C. 1973).
73. 21 Am. JUR. Proof of Facts Ann. § 2 at 4.
74. Keeton, supra note 69.
75. Goldsmith, supra note 74, at 10-11.
76. Id.
77. Id. See also § 402A, supra note 66, comment j at 353.
78. Goth, supra note 70, at 11.
[Vol. 27
38
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss4/10
LEARNED TREATISES
not always be the panacea that was intended, he should consider
the following:
[C]an the treating physician's testimony be supported or are
the possible defenses exceptionally strong? What will occur if no
other [physician] will support the treating physician? How can
the testimony of defendant's experts be minimized? What can
the attorney do if the treating physician begins to retreat from
his position as the time of trial nears because he is receiving no
other support? 9
The problems considered above graphically illustrate the
reasons for including rule 803(18) within the Federal Rules. More-
over, when considered in light of the policy foundation underlying
products liability law,8" they dictate that the rule receive liberal
interpretation, at least in products cases. The need for and the
trustworthiness of treatise evidence are the preeminent reasons
cited in justification of the exception; and in view of the safe-
guards built into the rule itself and other sections of the Federal
Rules, there appears to be no forceful reason for excluding
properly proffered treatises.
The need for treatise evidence readily emerges when viewed
within the context of the facts of Hickock. The article sought to
be admitted purported to establish that the use of the drug in-
creased the likelihood of blood clots which could cause epilepsy
nine times over women who were not on the pill. Assuming that
its relevance and authoritativeness could have been firmly estab-
lished,"' such an article may have been invaluable in demonstrat-
ing the defective nature of the drug, in proving causation, and in
discounting the likelihood that plaintiff's reaction had been
merely allergic or idiosyncratic. In view of what may have been a
paucity of other sources of information on the side-effects of the
drug," the need for such evidence could hardly have been denied.
Apart from a dearth of information, other factors underscore
the need for treatise evidence. Insofar as the amount of scientific
research, experimentation and marketing of drugs has expanded
79. 21 AMi. JUR. Proof of Facts Ann. § 37 at 50.
80. See notes 86-90 infra.
81. FED. R. Ev. 402, 803(18). See also WGMORE supra note 4, § 1424, where it is stated
that "the allowance of an exception to the Hearsay rule does not of itself dispense with
the application of the other auxiliary Rules of Probative Policy .... " (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted).
82. See 496 F.2d at 446.
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dramatically over the past several decades, there has been a cor-
responding proliferation in the number of works and studies done
on certain drugs. Thus, whereas in Hickock the lack of informa-
tion may have made it impossible to find an expert with the
required expertise, the sheer number of works written about a
particular subject may have the equally adverse effect of making
it extremely difficult to find an expert whose opinion is based
upon those treatises most supportive of plaintiff's case. 3 In fact,
the Hickock court noted that because of the recentness of the
proffered article, it would not be possible to assert that the plain-
tiff's expert had based his opinion thereon. 4 Even if such a knowl-
edgeable expert can be located, he may not be available for testi-
mony at trial, or the cost of employing him may be prohibitive.
As a result, a rule such as that followed in Hickock, requiring that
a treatise be admissible only to form the basis of expert opinion
or only when its author is available for testimony, may effectively
and unjustly cause the plaintiff to fail in meeting his burden of
proof.
The usual situation in which a cause of action arises against
a drug manufacturer underlines the problems inherent in the
Hickock holding. For instance, a person suffering from a drug-
related injury first goes to a physician. The treating physician's
diagnosis is that the injury was caused by a particular drug. That
diagnosis represents an opinion by the physician based upon
whatever empirical and published information he has at his com-
mand. The opinion, therefore, is only as trustworthy as the infor-
mation upon which it is based and, though actually correct, may
be based upon factors which are less than compelling. At the
same time there may be several treatises outstanding on the sub-
ject and with which the physician is not familiar but which are
more definitive on the issue. Should that information prove to be
relevant and authoritative, fairness would decree that it not be
excluded merely because another, more suitable expert is, for
some reason, unavailable or unaffordable or because the treatise
did not form the basis of the available expert's opinion.
83. Dean Wigmore accentuates this point by querying:
Out of the hundreds of scientific experts who are this month testifying in courts of
justice, how many are speaking from a thorough acquaintance with the latest re-
searches in their subjects? For how many of them is it possible to maintain steady
pace with the daily progress of science? How many are not testifying on information
obtained at a medical or other technical school a decade or more ago, in the standard
books of that day?
6 WIcMORE, supra note 4, § 1690(2).
84. 496 F.2d at 447. 40
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LEARNED TREATISES
It has been stated that products liability law has developed
because
the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of prod-
ucts which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the
seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that
public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon
those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the
consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protec-
tion at the hands of someone and the proper persons to afford it
are those who market the product."
Thus, because "the consumer [may be] at the mercy of those
who are supposed to serve him, unless the law adds its counter-
weight,"86 such innovations in products law as implied warranty,
strict liability, and the demise of privity were made "as ...
attempt[s] to tilt the balance more favorably toward the single
or individual consumer . "..87 "by arming [him] with civil rem-
edies and defenses designed to give him more adequate means of
looking after himself."88 Yet cases such as Hickock indicate that
even with these innovations in the law, burdens of proof may be
immense. Insight into the situation has moved one court to con-
clude that
[tihere would be little gain to the consuming public if the
courts would establish a form of recovery with one hand and
take it away with the other by establishing impossible standards
of proof. The proof required . . . must be realistically tailored
to the circumstances which caused the form of action to be
created."
Properly applied, rule 803(18) can serve to provide parties
with the ability to call upon a needed and reliable source of evi-
dence inexpensively and efficiently which has heretofore been
85. § 402A, supra note 66, comment c at 349-50.
86. F.R. Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Liability, 17 Bus. LAW. 157, 161 (1961).
87. T.A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Strict Liability, 17 SWAN. L. REV. 1077, 1086
(1964-65).
88. See note 86 supra.
89. Lindsay v. McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 639 (8th Cir. 1972).
The Lindsay court was speaking specifically about the lack of wisdom in not allowing
circumstantial proof of defect in products liability cases; however, the principle relates to
the contentions presented here.
1976]
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inequitably prohibited to them. The legal system would benefit
from the increased efficiency in litigation and from the weakening
of the notion that one gets only as much justice as he can afford."0
Just as importantly, society will profit from the assurance that
no longer will the presence of a dangerous product on the market
depend, even partially, upon the inability of an injured party to
comply with expensive or impossible live witness requirements.
If the courts continue to impose unrealistic burdens in estab-
lishing the authoritativeness of a treatise, in requiring that such
evidence form the basis of an expert's opinion, or in determining
whether a publication is encompassed by the rule, then the result
will be the frustration of the intended effect of rule 803(18)-to
provide parties with needed and reliable sources of evidence.
Harry A. Swagart III
90. Such a result would be in perfect step with the intended purpose and construction
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. As rule 102 states:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination
of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development
of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceed-
ings justly determined.
[Vol. 27
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BANKRUPTCY-PRIORITY OF DISTRIBUTION-WITHHOLDING
TAXES ON UNPAID WAGES, EARNED BY BANKRUPT'S EMPLOYEES PRIOR
TO BANKRUPTCY, ENTITLED TO SECOND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION. Otte
v. United States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974).
In Otte v. United States,I the Supreme Court held that with-
holding taxes on unpaid wages, earned by the employees of the
bankrupt, Freedomland, Inc., prior to bankruptcy, are entitled to
second priority status in the distribution of the bankrupt's as-
sets.2 In so holding, the Supreme Court put to rest a 27-year-old
conflict3 among the circuits and resolved the dispute of whether:
(1) wages paid as a priority distribution to a bankrupt's employ-
ees, to the extent of $600 of earned but unpaid wage claims each,
are subject to withholding taxes; (2) if such wages are subject to
withholding, whether taxing authorities must file proofs of claim;
and (3) whether such taxes, if required to be withheld, are to
enjoy priority distribution, and if so, at what level?4
There are basically three situations in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing in which the tax withholding issue can arise:'
(1) Where wages were earned and paid prior to the date of
bankruptcy6 and the applicable withholdings were not turned
over to the appropriate taxing authority as of the date of
bankruptcy.
(2) Where wages were earned and paid after the date of
bankruptcy.
1. 419 U.S. 43 (1974).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970), provides priority dividend
treatment for certain debts of the bankrupt ahead of distribution to general unsecured
creditors. Preferential treatment is provided for in the following order: (1) costs and
expenses of administering the bankrupt's estate [hereinafter referred to as first priority],
(2) unpaid wages not exceeding $600 earned by each employee of the bankrupt within 3
months of the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings [hereinafter referred to as
second priority], (3) creditor expenses incurred in setting aside the confirmation of an
arrangement, a wage-earner plan, or the bankrupt's discharge [hereinafter referred to as
third priority], (4) "taxes which became due and owing by the bankrupt to the United
States or to any State or any subdivision thereof. . ." [hereinafter referred to as fourth
priority], and (5) nontax debts owed to any person, including the United States, entitled
to priority by operation of law other than by § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act [hereinafter
referred to as fifth priority].
3. The genesis of the subject conflict is found in United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d
26 (8th Cir. 1947).
4. Id. at 44-45.
5. For a general discussion of secured, federal tax liens and the bankruptcy status
thereof see W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS (3d ed. 1972).
6. Regardless of the date of adjudication as a bankrupt, the "date of bankruptcy"
relates back to the date when the petition was filed, whether voluntary or involuntary.
Bankruptcy Act § 1(13), 11 U.S.C. § 1(13) (1970).
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(3) Where wages were earned prior to bankruptcy but were
paid during bankruptcy upon an entitlement to priority dividend
distribution under the Bankruptcy Act.
Although the basic thrust of the Bankruptcy Act is to treat
all unsecured creditors equally with respect to the distribution of
a bankrupt's assets,7 the Act articulates a federal policy for pref-
erential treatment toward certain enumerated creditors.' In the
context of the unsecured wage and tax claimants arising in the
three situations set out above, Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act
provides three possible sources of preferential relief.'"
Section 64a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provides first priority
treatment, ahead of all other priority distributees and other unse-
cured creditors," for the payment of "the costs and expenses of
administration, including the actual and necessary costs and ex-
penses of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the peti-
tion. .. ."2
Another priority is available to the former employees of the
bankrupt, who, on the date bankruptcy was commenced with the
filing of a petition, had accumulated earned wages remaining
unpaid. For the creditor-employees, the Act provides a second
priority, behind "costs and expenses of administration," to the
extent of $600 of unpaid wages earned within 3 months of the
bankruptcy petition by each former employee.'3
Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, every em-
ployer is required to withhold from an employee's gross wages and
7. See, e.g., United States v. Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. 29, 31 (1959); 3 W.
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 60.01, at 743 (14th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]. But
see Bankruptcy Act § 57(d), 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1970) (quid pro quo considerations to
equality of treatment in distribution).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See also 3A COLLIER T 60.02, at 2063-
65.
9. 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). For a general discussion of the section's legislative history
see 3A COLLIER 64.01, at 2046-63.
10. Bankruptcy Act §§ 64(a)(1), 62(a)(2), 64(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. §§ 104(a)(1),
104(a)(2), 104(a)(4) (1970). See note 2 supra.
11. Except in the case of a bankruptcy following a debtor relief proceeding, there are
no super-priorities within a priority class, and all priority class creditors are subject to
sharing pro rata. See Bankruptcy Act § 64(A)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1970); 3A COLLIER
64.101, at 2077. Additionally, funds available to unsecured priority creditors are to be
distributed only in the order provided. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
12. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1970).
13. Id. § 64(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1970). For amounts in excess of $600 of wages
earned prior to 3 months before the bankruptcy petition was filed, the employee stands
in the same position as all other unsecured creditors.
14. Id. § 64(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970).
[Vol. 27
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to hold in trust for the United States,'5 employee income tax
withholdings'" and employee contributions to Social Security,"
commonly listed on wage statements as FICA (Federal Insurance
Contribution Act) payments.' 8 The employer's liability for these
withheld funds accrues at the time the wages are actually paid, 9
indicating the further requirement that an "employer-employee"
relationship exist.
In those situations where a debtor made wage payments prior
to bankruptcy, the accrued tax liability, if unpaid to the Internal
Revenue Service, is entitled to fourth priority" dividend treat-
ment as taxes "legally due and owing by the bankrupt" before the
filing of a bankruptcy petition.' When wages are paid after the
date of bankruptcy to employees, for services to the bankrupt
estate, both the wages and the withholding tax liability enjoy a
first priority22 dividend treatment as costs of administration. 3
However, priority eligibility of withholding taxes on wages earned
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7501. The section provides, in part: "The amount of
such fund shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner and subject to the
same provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applicable with respect to the
taxes from which such fund arose." But see 3A COLLIER 7 64.02[3], at 2069.
16. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3402.
17. Id. § 3102.
18. The employer may also be required to withhold certain funds for state and local
taxing authorities, as well as pursuant to other federal taxing authority. E.g., INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 3202 (Railroad Retirement Tax).
19. Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3101-3, 31.3102-1 (FICA withholdings), 31.3402(a)-1(c),
31.3403-1 (Income Tax withholdings). See also 1 CCH UNEMPL. INs. REP. 7 10,220, 10,223-
27; 7 CCH 1975 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 7 4947, 4966-71. Willful failure to withhold a tax
or to pay over a withheld tax will result in a penalty equal to the amount in question,
regardless of whether it is ultimately collected from the employee. INT. RV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 6672. For such amounts as are actually withheld for income taxes but not turned over
to the government, however, the employee will receive a credit against his income tax.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 31(a).
20. United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510 (1942). See also In re John Home Co.,
220 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1955). Compare Pomper v. United States, 196 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1952)
(apportionability of employer's unemployment tax between pre- and post-bankruptcy
wages, which provide the measure of the excise tax under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3301),
with In re Berkshire Hardware Co., 39 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1941) (fourth priority for
"employer's contribution" to state unemployment compensation fund, measured by a
percentage of payroll while in receivership after the date of bankruptcy).
21. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970). See also 3A COLLIER 7
64.401-7. See note 2 and accompanying text, supra.
22. Missouri v. Glieck, 135 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1943); United States v. Killoren, 119
F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1941). See also United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513 (1971) (rejecting
that a super-priority is created by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7501, and holding that any
trust funds in favor of the United States enjoy only that priority the taxes, from which
the fund arose, would otherwise enjoy under the Bankruptcy Act). See generally 3A
COLLIER 7 64.02[4], at 2070-74.
23. See 3A COLLIER 7 64.101-7.
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before the date of bankruptcy, but paid as a priority wage divi-
dend by a trustee, 4 has proven to be the focal point of 27 years
of court conflict in terms of bankruptcy priority.
A history of cases25 has held that income and social security
taxes must be withheld from such earned but unpaid wages as
were claimed by Freedomland's former employees. In 1947, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Fogarty,26
determined that the Internal Revenue Code required a trustee in
bankruptcy, upon dividend distribution to second priority wage
claimants, to make proper withholdings2 and turn over the with-
held revenues as a first priority distribution. The court reasoned
that, since the tax was not payable at the date of bankruptcy, and
had accrued when paid during the trustee's administration of the
bankrupt's estate, such taxes became a claim by the United
States against the trustee and were entitled to dividend treat-
ment as a "cost and expense of administration" by the trustee.2 1
24. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1970). See also 3A COLLIER
64.201.5. See note 2 and accompanying text, supra.
25. See Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201, reh. denied, 246 F.2d
70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 857 (1957); United States v. Curtis, 178 F.2d 268, 269
(6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950); United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26,
30-33 (8th Cir. 1947); In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 189, 190 (D. Pa..
1963), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964); In re Daigle, 111 F. Supp.
109, 111 (D. Me. 1953).
26. 164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947), rev'g sub. nom. In re Inland Waterways, Inc., 71 F.
Supp. 134 (D. Minn. 1947).
27. The court found support for the withholding requirement under the 1938 counter-
part to section 3401 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, which provides in part: "If the
person for whom the individual performs or performed the services does not have control
of the payment of the wages for such services, the term 'employer'... means the person
having control of the payment of such wages [i.e., the trustee] . . " INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 3401(d)(1) (emphasis added). See Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(d)-1(b) (character as
"wages" not lost because employer-employee relationship terminated; "employer" for
purpose of defining "wages" as remuneration for services performed for such person may
be different from "employer" for purpose of defining person with control over remunera-
tion's payment). Even though there is no similar wording in the Social Security provisions,
the court found a legislative intent to formulate a coordinated withholding system based
on a "wage" characterization; that a payor-payee characterization would not be determi-
native of the responsibility of the trustee, standing "in the shoes of the employer-
bankrupt", to make withholdings from amounts paid to wage claimants. See H.R. Rep.
No. 510, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, quoted in U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 2-41 (1943). United
States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26, 28-33 (8th Cir. 1947). Cf. Social Security Bd. v. Nierotoko,
327 U.S. 358 (1946); Educational Fund of the Elec. Indus. v. United States, 426 F.2d 1053
(2d Cir. 1970). But see 48 Am. BANKR. L.J. 87, 93 (1974) ("[P]ayment of a wage claim
dividend is not the payment of wages by an employer but the payment by a trustee of a
debt for wages earned by a claimant but not paid by the bankrupt employer. . . ."). For
other cases upholding the withholding requirement see note 25 supra.
28. Ten years later, similar priority treatment was accorded an employer's contribu-
tions to a state's unemployment insurance system based on wages paid out as a second
46
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Fogarty and the first priority position received much critical
evaluation,"5 not only from the viewpoint of the added adminis-
trative burden placed upon the trustee," but also from that of a
legal criticism3' focusing on the failure of such withholding taxes
priority distribution. Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201, reh. denied,
246 F.2d 70 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 857 (1957). Cf. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§
3301, 3302. The Ninth Circuit extrapolated from the reasoning of Fogarty to find a trustee
responsible for segregating and paying over funds equal to an "employer's" tax on second
priority "wages," and endorsed the trustee's action in withholding state and federal taxes
of the employees. The court found added impetus in Section 926 of the California Unem-
ployment Insurance Code for the proposition that the second priority distribution consti-
tuted "wages" for purposes of assessment of employer tax liability, the section defining
"wages," in part, as, "all remuneration payable for personal service ...by force of
statute." 242 F.2d at 203 (emphasis added). For this first priority treatment of the em-
ployer's tax, the court also relied on Pomper v. United States, 196 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1952),
in which the court found a "determining factor" to be "when the wages were paid out and
not who was in possession." 246 F.2d at 72 (court's emphasis).
29. Recently, interpretation of Fogarty, both by courts and commentators, as holding
"all withholding taxes are § 64(a)(1) costs of administration," has been criticized as a
misreading, misunderstanding, and misciting of the Ninth Circuit case. 48 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 87, 90 (1974). As the author correctly summarized, Fogarty involved a trustee action
to collect money owed by the Navy Department to the estate of the bankrupt, against
which debt the circuit court allowed the United States to offset a claim for withholding
taxes the government claimed should have been deducted, and paid to the government,
from previously distributed wage claim dividends. Id. The author found the factual con-
text critical, noting: "A legitimate offset is altogether unrelated to the priority provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act in any way." Id. In the abstract, the writer is correct. Bankruptcy
Act § 68, 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1970). However, offsetting debts and credits requires, by the
very wording of the Act, the element of mutuality. A prebankruptcy claim by an estate
and a postbankruptcy claim by the government lacks the requisite mutuality. Compare
United States v. Luther, 225 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1955), with United States v. Fogarty, 164
F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947). See Bankruptcy Act § 63(a), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1970) (provable
debts relating to those arising before date of bafikruptcy). See generally 4 CoLLER T
68.04, 68.10. In Fogarty the debt to the government accrued upon payment of the wage
claims, after the date of bankruptcy.
30. Hiller, The Folly of the Fogarty Case, 32 REF. J. 54(1958). The concerns of Referee
Hiller centered around the bankruptcy policy of keeping fees and administrative expenses
to a minimum, see 3A Collier 62.02[11], 62.05[1], while at the same time being
required to make proper withholdings and perform all filing and reporting requirements.
see, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § § 6051(a) (W-2 forms to employees), 6051(d) (duplicate
to I.R.S.), 6001 (make returns, render statements, and keep records as I.R.S. requires),
6011 (returns for taxes owed).
31. Note, 56 MicH. L. REv. 631 (1958). Substantive criticism of first priority treat-
ment concerned the "anomaly" of granting taxes a priority ahead of wages with the
possibility of depleting funds otherwise available to wage claimants, notwithstanding the
apparent legislative policy to grant wage claims priority over tax claims as reflected in
the provisions of section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. Additionally, it was pointed out that
the payment of such withholding taxes did not fulfill the essential requirement of the Act
to be accorded first priority consideration, viz., that the tax was a cost or expense neces-
sary to the preservation of the estate, Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1)
(1970), or a cost of distributing the wages. "If the tax were on the distribution of the wage
claim, tle tax could be a valid expense of administration since distribution is a part of
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to fulfill the quid pro quo of being a cost of "preserving the es-
tate. 13 2 However, 17 years elapsed after the Fogarty pronounce-
ments before the Third Circuit adopted an alternative approach
of granting income withholdings and employee social security
taxes, arising from second priority wage payments, fourth priority
treatment.
In In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc. ,33 the district court
followed Fogarty and others34 in concluding that the trustee in
bankruptcy must withhold payroll taxes.35 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the district court insofar as
the trustee was ordered to pay over the employment taxes as a
first priority distribution,36 reasoning that neither Fogarty and
the precedents relied upon therein,3" nor the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act 38 supported such priority treatment. The court of
administration; but the tax in question is not a tax on distribution but a tax on wages
paid." 56 MICH. L. REv. at 632. But cf. Adair v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n,
303 U.S. 350, 360 (1938); United States v. Kalishman, 346 F.2d 514 (8th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1003 (1966). See also Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the
Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228, 276 (1967); Note, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 546, 546-48 (1965);
31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 383, 388-89 (1974); 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 360, 362 (1965). See generally
3A COLLIER T 64.102.
32. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1970).
33. 223 F. Supp. 189 (D. Pa. 1963).
34. See note 25 supra.
35. 223 F. Supp. at 191. The district court's order, however, failed to direct collection
and payment of the employer's excise tax, a claim made by the government before the
referee, in addition to the claim for payroll withholdings. See note 28 supra. The circuit
court's discussion would seem equally pertinent to the "employer's" excise liability.
Compare In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964), with Lines v.
California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201, reh. denied, 246 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1957).
The case was additionally confused by the fact that the referee directed nonpriority
payment of claims for wages earned prior to 3 months before the date of bankruptcy, and
the government claimed first priority treatment with respect to employer and employee
taxes assessable on such general creditor, "wage" dividends. 223 F. Supp. at 189.
36. In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 109 (3d Cir. 1964).
37. Id. at 99 & n.10 ("The ultimate result in Fogarty rests on a number of cases which
lend little support to that holding, and if anything, detract from the reasoning of the
Eighth Circuit."). The Third Circuit noted that cases relied upon by the Eighth Circuit
in reaching their decision in Fogarty involved postpetition, preadjudication situations
where the bankrupt or trustee was in possession and operating the business. See Note, 19
RUTGERS L. REV. 546 (1965) ("We are not impressed with the reasoning of the court in the
Fogarty case. .. ").
38. 336 F.2d at 101-03. The court found Fogarty's first priority treatment wanting for
its failure to abide by a strict statutory requirement of being an expense, the nature of
which developed or preserved the bankrupt's estate. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(1), 11 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(1) (1970). See note 31 supra. Connecticut Motor Lines correctly concluded that
the critical distinction between a postbankruptcy expense attributable to prebankruptcy
benefits and one attributable to preservation for creditors was the cleavage point for
purposes of first priority distribution. Cf. Denton & Anderson Co. v. Induction Heating
Corp., 178 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1949). 48
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss4/10
1976] PRIORITY OF DISTRIBUTION 793
appeals concluded, instead, that the trustee, standing in the
shoes of the bankrupt, must hold back the employment taxes and
pay them over as "legally due and owing by the bankrupt," 9 since
at the date of bankruptcy one could calculate, from records avail-
able at such time, the maximum employment taxes that could
possibly become due if all unpaid prebankruptcy wages were
paid." They thus concluded that employment taxes on a second
priority wage distribution were entitled to fourth priority consid-
eration. The court, however, disallowed the government's enjoy-
ment of such treatment since they had failed to file proofs of
claims,4' even for the easily calculable maximum tax liability.
The Second Circuit's disposition of the controversy between
William Otte, trustee for the bankrupt Freedomland, Inc., and
the United States, presented the third and final approach to this
conflict, ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court. Freedom-
land, Inc. filed a petition for relief under Chapter XI of the Bank-
39. 336 F.2d 104, 105, Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970). The
Third Circuit relied upon In re William F. Fisher & Co., 148 F. 907 (D.N.J. 1906), a
bankruptcy case arising under the 1898 Act, which, because taxes "legally due and owing
by the bankrupt" were accorded priority by § 64(a) above all other priority classes in §
64(b), held that tax liabilities incurred by a trustee, standing in the shoes of the bankrupt,
were to be accorded priority under § 64(a). The confusion surrounding this early Act as it
pertained to tax priorities was remedied by subsequent legislative clarification, see 3A
COLLIER 64.402[1]-[3], and in particular by court determination that there is a
substantial distinction to be drawn from pre- and postbankruptcy accrual of a liability.
See, e.g., In re John Home Co., 220 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1955); In re Fago Constr. Corp., 162
F. Supp. 238 (D.N.Y. 1957). Cf. In re International Match Corp., 79 F.2d 203 (2d Cir.
1935); In re California Pea Prods., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 658 (D. Cal. 1941). See Plumb, note
31 supra, at 273-74. See generally. 3A COLLIER 64.405.
40. 336 F.2d at 105 ("A maximum wage due would certainly be discernible from the
bankrupt's records. Thus, a maximum tax due, albeit in futuro, could also be established.
This amount is as certain as the tax which falls into the fourth priority when wage claims
are paid prior to filing.") Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 63(a)(8), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(8) (1970)
("provable debts" include "contingent debts.") See generally 3A COLuIR 63.30. In this
connection, the Third Circuit reasoned that if the trustee could be "Bankrupt-employer
for the purpose of wage payments," he could be considered "Bankrupt-employer. . .for
the payment of the taxes on those wage distributions," and therefore the contingent tax
debt of the "Bankrupt-employer" was provable and entitled to fourth priority treatment
as "due and owing" by the "Bankrupt-employer." 336 F.2d at 106. The Third Circuit's
major flaw in this regard was its failure to appreciate the dual role of the word "employer"
under the Internal Revenue Code, see note 27 supra, in that "employer" for purposes of
defining the person for whom services are performed for wages is wholly distinct from
"employer" for purposes of defining the person paying the remuneration due and responsi-
ble for making payroll withholdings and paying them over to the Internal Revenue Service.
The "Bankrupt-employer" is liable for the withholding taxes only if he "control[s] . ..
the payment of. . .wages," INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 3401(d)(1), and under the condi-
tions being considered, the "Bankrupt-employer" has lost control of the payment by
virtue of-his adjudication as a bankrupt.
41. Bankruptcy Act §§ 57, 63, 11 U.S.C. §§ 93, 103 (1970).
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ruptcy Act 2 on September 15, 1964. That arrangement failed and
Freedomland was adjudicated a bankrupt on August 30, 1965.
During the period prescribed by statute, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, William Otte, received filed proofs of claims against Free-
domland's estate, 3 including 413 claims of former employees of
the bankrupt for unpaid wages amounting to approximately
$80,000 earned within 3 months of the September 15, 1964, peti-
tion. Although the United States filed proofs of claims for federal
income and social security taxes due on wages actually paid prior
to the Chapter XI petition, the government failed to file any
proofs of claims with respect to amounts due on unpaid wages
earned prior to the petition." The trustee, Otte, successfully
moved before the referee for an order authorizing distribution of
the earned priority wages without withholding income, social se-
curity, or any other payroll taxes.
District Judge Motley rejected the referee's conclusion that
the objective of efficient administration of a bankrupt estate
would be undermined by the added burden of requiring the trus-
tee to make employment withholdings on such wage distribu-
tions, 5 thus joining the long line of cases endorsing Fogarty."
Moving on to the more critical consideration, Judge Motley
agreed with the Third Circuit's decision in Connecticut Motor
Lines47 that the employment withholdings were to enjoy fourth
42. Id. §§ 301-399, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1970).
43. Id. §§ 57, 63, 11 U.S.C. §§ 93, 103 (1970).
44. In the Otte decision, the United States was joined by the City of New York in
claiming that the trustee should be required to withhold New York City taxes on priority
claims for wages earned but unpaid at the inception of the bankruptcy proceeding; how-
ever, because the provisions of the New York City Administrative Code dealing with tax
withholding requirements are essentially identical to the federal counterparts for purposes
of the legal issues involved, the text of this paper will concentrate on framing the issues
and discussion thereof in the context of the federal taxing authorities. See generally NEw
YoRK Crrv ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ T46-1.0 et seq., U 46-.10 et seq.
45. 341 F. Supp. 647, 651-54. The referee had relied exclusively on Russell Hiller's
criticism of Fogarty, see note 31 supra, in deciding that Otte would not be required to
withhold taxes. However, the district court considered the easy availability of important
data regarding the employees, as well as the simplicity of the reporting requirements,
necessitating only the services of a clerk, more convincing. 341 F. Supp. at 652-53. More-
over, Judge Motley considered the practice of the Internal Revenue Service in the South-
ern District of New York, to allow a trustee to withhold a flat 25 percent of gross wages in
lieu of code and regulation computations, of singular persuasiveness that the trustee would
not suffer added administrative burden. 341 F. Supp. at 652. Cf. Nicholas v. United
States, 384 U.S. 678, 695 (1966) (trustee's withholding and filing requirements regarding
wages paid by debtor in possession under Chapter XI not burdensome).
46. 341 F. Supp. at 654. Cf. Educational Fund of the Elec. Indus. v. United States,
426 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir. 1970). See note 5 supra.
47. 336 F.2d 96.
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priority treatment."
On appeal, the Second Circuit" affirmed Judge Motley's
conclusion that Mr. Otte was under a duty to withhold income
and social security taxes from second priority wage dividends"
but reversed his judgment that the withheld funds were entitled
to fourth priority distribution.51 Instead, Circuit Judge Oakes,
writing for the Second Circuit, advanced the alternative ap-
proach that the amount withheld would enjoy second priority
treatment along with the earned, but unpaid, wages."
The court reasoned that, "[cionceptually the tax payments
should be treated in the same way as the wages from which they
derive and of which they are a part"53 since the taxes are carved
from the gross, second priority wages upon the act of withholding
and are credited toward the income tax liability of the employee. 4
Except for the observation that the taxes "derive from the pay-
ments" of wages, 5  the court failed to provide a substantial analy-
sis supportive of the second priority treatment. Also, the court
failed to cite authority supporting the Second Circuit's position,
except by way of the "analogy" to be found in In re Quakertown
48. See notes 39 & 39 and accompanying text supra. Two years following Connecticut
Motor Lines, § 64(a)(4) was amended to read: "[Tiaxes which became legally due and
owing by the bankrupt. (italicized word added by amendment, Act of July 5, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-496, § 3, 80 Stat. 271.)." Judge Motley found the change inconsequential since,
with passage of the amendment, "[tihe Congress did not undertake to define the term
'legally due and owing."' 341 F. Supp. at 656. See 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
2468. The judge observed that a tax debt was "due and owing" if it was computable prior
to bankruptcy, see notes 38 & 39 supra, noting: "The time of the accrual of the obligation
to pay rather than the time when the obligation is to be discharged by payment is the
controlling feature. In re International Match Corp., 79 F.2d 203, 205 (2d Cir. 1935)." 341
F. Supp. at 656.
The judge went on to reason that since the taxes were "part of the wages due each
employee," and since the obligation to pay the wages had accrued before bankruptcy, the
tax obligation had likewise accrued along with the obligation to pay the wages, "although
the taxes were not payable until the wages are paid." Id. The argument has a superficial
symmetry; it ignores the plain wording of the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations that
the tax liability does not attach until the wages are paid and that there would be no
assessable tax obligation if the wages remained unpaid. See note 19 and accompanying
text supra.
49. 480 F.2d 184.
50. Id. at 189.
51. Id. at 190.
52. 480 F.2d at 190.
53. Id.
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 31(a). See also Trees. Reg. § 1.31-1(a) ("If the tax has
actually been withheld at the source, credit or refund shall be made to the recipient of
the income even though such tax has not been paid over to the Government by the
employer.")
55. 480 F.2d at 190.
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Shopping Center, Inc.," which held that the Internal Revenue
Service could levy upon the claim of a taxpayer-creditor against
a bankrupt debtor's estate, without approval of the bankruptcy
court, since the effect of the levy was the transformation of the
Internal Revenue Service into an involuntary assignee of the cred-
itor."7
Notwithstanding some debatable weakness in the analogy, 8
the importance of the holding stands squarely on the proposition
that the withholding taxes, as part of the gross wages, are to be
granted the same priority as the wages from which they are de-
rived. In this regard, the court also held that since the withhold-
ing taxes were derived from the wages, the government did not
have to file a proof of claim 5 -the government is a constructive
claimant putting its claim before the trustee and all other credi-
tors by being included in the claims of employees with earned but
unpaid wages.6"
Upon review of Freedomland,61 the Supreme Court agreed
with the Second Circuit's almost uncontestable conclusion that
the trustee is under a duty to withhold taxes on second priority
56. 366 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966). The conclusion that the Second Circuit intended
Quakertown Shopping Center as supportive merely "by analogy" is reflected in the court's
citation, "Cf. "See Comment, 31 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 383, 390 (1974), the author conclud-
ing that the Second Circuit must have intended, by its citation of Quakertown, to suggest
that the Internal Revenue Service became an involuntary assignee of the claimants con-
temporaneously with the payment of gross wage claims.
57. 366 F.2d at 98.
58. See Comment, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 383, 390-91 (1974). The author finds a
fatal flaw in the "involuntary assignee" theory, as he attributes it to the Second Circuit,
when read with the trust fund treatment to be accorded withholding taxes pursuant to
section 7501 of the Internal Revenue Code. See note 15 supra. The perceived flaw is found
in the nature of the trust, which is held for the benefit of the government and not the wage
claimants, who do not acquire such an interest as could be assigned, voluntarily or invol-
untarily. This whole line of discussion, however, ignores the fact that Quakertown was
cited solely for the purpose of drawing an analogy going to the issue of a tax being a part
of some larger and qualitatively different fund.
59. 480 F.2d 184, 191. On this issue, the circuit court found itself in agreement with
Judge Motley, even though the district court has considered the withheld taxes to be
fourth priority items principally because both courts proceeded from the premise that the
taxes were a part of the wages due.
60. A collateral issue surrounding New York City's claim for withholding taxes, see
note 44 supra, involved the allowability of the city's claim since the city did not pass the
withholding legislation until after the wages were earned, but before they were paid. The
district court disallowed the claim because it was not "computable" at the date of bank-
ruptcy within the requirements of fourth priority status. 341 F. Supp. 647, 658. However,
the Second Circuit allowed the claim since the liability arose at the time the wages were
paid, well after passage of the subject legislation. 480 F.2d 184, 191.
61. In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. Otte v. United
States, 419 U.S. 43 (1974).
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wage distributions, 2 and ruled that claims would not have to be
filed 3 before answering the more critical issue of the priority to
be granted the withheld funds. 4 In one brief paragraph the Court
held that the taxes were not entitled to fourth priority treatment65
on the grounds that the tax had not accrued prior to the payment
of wages and was thus not a tax "legally due and owing"6 by the
bankrupt prior to bankruptcy. 7 The Court proceeded to give
equal treatment to the question of first priority entitlement, con-
cluding that the withholding taxes had nothing to do with the
estate's preservation, nor were they classifiable as "costs or ex-
penses of doing business," but rather were "attributable in their
entirety to the availability of funds for the payment of priority
wage claims."68
Having rejected both first and fourth priority status, the
Court agreed with the Second Circuit's69 second priority treat-
ment since, "[tihe withholding taxes [were], in full effect, part
of the claims themselves and [derived] from and [were] carved
out of the payment of those claims."7 Except for the Court's
specific rejection of the argument that the Supreme Court's dicta
in United States v. Randall7 1 to the effect that the Bankruptcy
Act "is an overriding statement of federal policy on this question
62. Id. at 48-54. See notes 25, 27, 30, 35 & 45 supra. The petitioner, Otte, had also
advanced the argument that his liability for the withheld amount pursuant to section 6672
of the Internal Revenue Code, see note 19 supra, was in the nature of a "penalty," by the
very wording of the provision, and such was barred by section 57(j) of the Bankruptcy Act.
11 U.S.C. § 93(j) (1970). See Brief for Petitioner at 19, Otte v. United States, 419 U.S. 43
(1974). The Supreme Court found the provision inapplicable since it imposes "a penalty,
apart from the tax," which was not the case before the Court. 419 U.S. at 52. But cf. Hertz,
Personal Liabilities of the Unsuspecting Executive for Penalties Under Section 6672 and
Other Nightmares, 32 INsT. ON FED. TAXATION 1171, 1186-90 (1974) (bankruptcy distin-
guishable; not punitive, but compensatory). With respect to the rejected argument that
withholding is an undue burden on the trustee see note 45 supra. See also Rzv. PROC. 71-
18, 1971-1 Cum. BULL. 684 (use of unified magnetic tape format for reporting of wages,
earnings, and related data).
63. 419 U.S. 43, 54-55. The Court reasoned that since the purpose of section 57 of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93, was to place trustee and creditors on notice of existing
claims, the notice requirement was fulfilled by the filings of the wage claimants. Also,
since the tax was not a debt of the bankrupt, no claim was required.
64. 419 U.S. 43, 55-58.
65. Id. at 56.
66. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4) (1970).
67. See notes 39 & 40 supra.
68. 419 U.S. 43, 57.
69. 480 F.2d 184, 190.
70. 419 U.S. 43, 57.
71. 401 U.S. 513 (1971).
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of priorities,"72 would preclude equal, second priority treatment
of both the wages and withholding taxes,73 the Supreme Court's
only discussion of the issue was by way of endorsement of the
Second Circuit's cursory discussion.74
Criticism of the Second Circuit's holding,7" left unanswered
by the Supreme Court, has been advanced in the following partic-
ulars:
(1) That the withheld taxes were not "wages," such as to
be accorded second priority treatment, within the parameters of
that word as interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc.,76 a case involving "wage" status,
under the Bankruptcy Act, to employer contributions to a union
welfare fund."
(2) That the statutory construction of Section 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act,7" which provides in two separate places that
withholding taxes and earned but unpaid priority wages are non-
dischargeable,7" would require "treating withholding taxes as dis-
tinct and separate from wages."8
(3) That second priority treatment for withholding taxes on
72. Id. at 515.
73. 419 U.S. 43, 57-58. Mr. Justice Blackmun, author of the dissenting opinion in
Randall and writing for the Supreme Court in Otte, restricted the Randall holding in the
following respects:
The case concerned § 7501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. . .with its provi-
sion for a trust fund for withheld taxes, and the impact of that statute, when
not complied with, upon payment of first priority costs and expenses of adminis-
tration.
419 U.S. at 57 (emphasis added). Such a restrictive reading ignores the plain wording of
section 7501 which expressly requires that the fund, even when the trust is complied with,
be paid over "in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations...
as are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such fund arose." bNT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 7501(a); United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513, 517 (1971). See note 22 supra.
74. 419 U.S.43, 57.
75. Comment, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 383 (1974). See also 48 Ahi. BANICR. L.J. 87
(1974).
76. 359 U.S. 29 (1959). Accord, Joint Indus. Bd. of the Elec. Indus. v. United States,
391 U.S.224 (1968).
77. 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. at 391-92 (1974).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
79. The Bankruptcy Act provides that certain debts of the bankrupt shall not be
discharged and shall survive bankruptcy adjudication and liquidation, including: (1)
taxes "which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws
of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof," Bankruptcy Act §
17(a)(i)(e), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1)(e) (1970); and (2) debts which "are for wages and com-
missions to the extent they are entitled to priority under subdivision a of Section 64
." Bankruptcy'Act § 17(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(5) (1970).
80. 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 393.
[Vol. 27
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earned but unpaid wages could result in a higher priority for the
taxes than the wages if such wages were not entitled to priority
treatment, as would be the case if the wages were earned more
than 3 months prior to bankruptcy or were in excess of $600 owing
to each employee8' and were thus distributed in part as an unse-
cured creditor dividend.
2
The criticism is unfounded, and the Supreme Court's and
Second Circuit's decisions seem to be sound, although both could
have more fully articulated the basis for the conclusion that
"[c]onceptually the tax payments should be treated in the same
way as the wages from which they derive and of which they are a
part." 3 A better analogy to the proposition stated above can be
found in the cases and discussions surrounding withholding taxes
correctly assigned first priority as costs and expenses of adminis-
tration." In the first priority situation, there is a recognition of
the important cleavage between prebankruptcy and postbank-
ruptcy expenses,8 5 as well as the taxes"' attributable to some
prebankruptcy and postbankruptcy activity. In the latter case, as
applied to withholding taxes, it is not the act of withholding and
paying over to the Internal Revenue Service 7 that triggers first
priority entitlement, but rather that the taxes are a part of and
attributable to the wages paid for services to the bankrupt es-
tate. As one commentator has noted:
Because the taxes accrue and become property of the govern-
ment simultaneously with the actual payment of wages,. . . as
a practical matter the taxes assume the same priority as the
wages from which they are deducted.89
81. Bankruptcy Act § 64(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1970).
82. 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. at 394-95.
83. 480 F.2d 184, 190.
84. Cf. note 37 supra.
85. See, e.g., Denton & Anderson Co. v. Induction Heating Corp., 178 F.2d 841 (2d
Cir. 1949) (commissions attributable to orders filled prior to bankruptcy not entitled to
first priority treatment).
86. See, e.g., In re Mt. Washington S.S. Co., 43 F. Supp. 176 (D.N.H. 1942) (a use
tax payable after bankruptcy, but attributable to the use of a ship prior thereto not
entitled to first priority treatment).
87. But see Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201, reh. denied, 246
F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947).
88. See Missouri v. Glieck, 135 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1943); United States v. Killoren,
119 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1941); In re Lambertville Rubber Co., 111 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1940).
Cf. Boteler v. Ingles, 308 U.S. 57 (1939) (local taxes, penalties, and fees attributable to
doing business); Michigan v. Michigan Trust Co., 286 U.S. 334 (1932) (franchise tax
attributable to privilege of doing business). See generally Plumb, supra note 31, at 274.
89. Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 360, 362 (1965).
19761
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The withholdings' dual character as a "wage" as well as a
tax, is in conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc.,"0 since the gross wages from
which they are carved are "wages" within the terms of that case.
Additionally, even though the Otte decision" and the decision of
the court of appeals" speak in terms of second priority treatment
for withholding taxes on earned but unpaid wages distributed
after bankruptcy, the reasoning of the courts would seem to pre-
clude a higher priority for the taxes than that accorded the
wages. 3 Thus, if a part of a wage claim is paid out as an unse-
cured creditor dividend, the withholding taxes carved out would
also be distributed to the Internal Revenue Service as an unse-
cured creditor dividend. 4
Finally, with respect to the argument that Congress intended
that withholding taxes and wages remain forever separate, 5 such
intention being reflected in Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act,9" a
careful reading of the Act indicates that withholding taxes on
earned but unpaid wages distributable under the Act as a priority
are not discharged merely by force of the provision maling such
wages nondischargeable.9 7
It is interesting to note that the "Report of the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States""8 and its proposed
Bankruptcy Act,"9 designed to replace in its entirety the existing
Bankruptcy Act, was public before the Otte decision"9 was ren-
90. 359 U.S. 29 (1959). See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
91. 419 U.S. 43.
92. 480 F.2d 184.
93. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
94. There is no conflict with the policy that unsecured creditors share pro rata since
proration takes place contemporaneously with the decision allowing a portion of the wage
claims to be paid, the government's share being carved out of the prorated portion to be
credited against the income tax liability of the employee. But see 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
383, 395 n.65 (1974) (computational difficulties arising out of double proration, both with
respect to gross wages out of which the withholdings are carved, and again with respect
to the amount constituting the share carved from the gross wages).
95. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
96. Bankruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
97. Id. § 17(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(5) (1970). The provision making withholding
taxes nondischargeable, id. § 35(a)(1)(e), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(1)(e), relates only to fourth
priority withholding taxes due and owing by the bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy. See
note 81 supra.
98. H.R. Doc. No. 137 Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973).
99. H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973); H.R. 10792, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess, S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
100. 419 U.S. 43.
[Vol. 27
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dered or even argued before the Supreme Court,10' but the Court
never acknowledged the Proposed Act' 2 as it related to the" prior-
ity issue under consideration. The Commission adopted the
Freedomland'0 3 decision in the proposed Act and expressly pro-
vided:
The trustee shall deduct from the amount to be paid for [wage]
claims having priority. . . and any other claims for compensa-
tion for personal services the amount required to be withheld
• . . and, subject to the other provisions of this section, remit
such amount to the appropriate governmental agency. § 4-
405(c).'4
Still unresolved by the courts is the question of what priority
is to be accorded the employer's tax as measured by priority wage
distributions.' 5 The issue, not before the Supreme Court in Otte,
remains divided between first and fourth priority.' 6 However, the
Proposed Bankruptcy Act would accord such tax the same prior-
ity as that accorded an employee tax owed by the bankrupt at the
date of bankruptcy, comparable to a fourth priority under the
current act. '
For the same reasons that the first and fourth priorities were
found wanting of a rational basis with regard to employee tax
liability in Otte, neither priority should be applied in the case of
101. Id. The "Report" of the Commission was referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House and ordered to be printed on September 6, 1973; oral argument
before the Supreme Court was heard October 15, 1974, and the decision was rendered
November 19, 1974.
102. H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973). Cf. Bill of the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, H.R. 16643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., S. 4060, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974) (identical to the "Commission" proposal with respect to the priority to be
accorded withholding taxes on earned but unpaid wages entitled to priority distribution).
For a general comparison of the two proposals see Lee, A Critical Comparison of the
Commission Bill and the Judge's Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 A.
BANKR. L.J. 1 (Winter 1975).
103. 480 F.2d 184.
104. See H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part 1I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 111, 114 (1973).
105. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3301, 3302.
106. Compare Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201, reh. denied,
246 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1957) (first priority), with In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336
F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964) (fourth priority).
107. Proposed Bankruptcy Act §§ 4-405(a)(5)(D), 4-405(C); H.R. Doc. No. 137, Part
II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 110, 111 (1973). But see Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Priority and Dischargeability of Tax Claims,
59 CORNELL L. REV. 991, 1020 (1974) ("Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the pro-
posal should go so fat as to rock the ... tax liability behind, rather than equal to, the
prebankruptcy wage claims, with the result that the full amount of the wage claims is
payable before any part of the tax on such payment.")
1976]
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an employer's tax liability. Second priority treatment would be
equally inapplicable since the employer's tax is distinct from, and
not carved out of, the employee's wages.
Rather than artificially placing the trustee's employer liabil-
ity on a par with a bankrupt's prebankruptcy liability, the legisla-
ture or the courts, as the case may be, might consider the cost to
other creditors versus the loss to the government as an overriding
reason to deny priority. Having cured the artificiality surround-
ing employee withholdings, it is even more anomalous to hold on
to an artificial priority status merely because the Act lacks a
rationally constructed niche in which to place the employer tax
liability.
Without a rationally based priority, it would seem even more
reasonable to admit that government sovereignty alone is no rea-
son for granting government claims ahead of other creditors, and
to relegate such employer tax liability to the status of an unse-
cured creditor claim, especially in light of the overwhelming, non-
artificial conclusion that "the federal tax priority has a miniscule
effect on federal revenues but a major effect on dividends prior
to unsecured creditors in bankruptcy cases."10 Whatever the out-
come, it is hoped that resolution of the question of employer's tax
liability will not take the 27 years it has taken in the case of
employee tax withholdings.
Brian F. Kernaghan
108. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 131 (Brookings
Inst. 1971). See also S. ENZER, R. DEBRIGARD & F. LAZAR, SOME CONSIDERATIONS CONCERN-
ING BANKRUPTCY REFORM 11, 60-63 (Inst. for the Future 1973).
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